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History

for the IB Diploma

**Causes, Practices
and Effects of Wars**

Mike Wells



History

for the IB Diploma

The Algerian War

Additional case study for Causes, Practices and Effects of Wars

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The Algerian War

Introduction

Algeria was one of the few African countries to achieve independence through violent revolution. The Algerian War, fought between Algerian nationalists and France, is a classic example of the success of a guerrilla movement against a well-resourced colonial army.

Maghreb The countries of north-west Africa – Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia – were collectively called the *Maghreb*, an Arabic word meaning ‘the land of the setting sun’, or ‘the west’.

During the course of the 19th century, nearly all of Africa came under the control of European colonial powers, with only Ethiopia and Liberia retaining their independent status. In the process of colonisation, African people lost their land and independence, and the colonies were ruled in the economic interests of the colonial powers, exploited as a source of raw materials and food supplies, and as a market for manufactured goods. Colonial rule at its best was paternalistic and discriminatory, and at its worst cruel and oppressive. The French empire in Africa was substantial, covering French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, the island of Madagascar and the **Maghreb** in North Africa, which included Algeria.

Africa remained under European control until after the Second World War, when the rise of nationalist movements, as well as the decline of the European colonial powers, led to decolonisation and independence. For most African countries, the path to independence was a peaceful one, following constitutional negotiations between the nationalist leaders and European governments. However, for countries like Algeria, with large numbers of European settlers who were reluctant to accept majority rule, the process involved lengthy wars of liberation. In Algeria, the French army and 1 million settlers fought an eight-year war against Algerian nationalists in an unsuccessful effort to retain French control. In what became one of the most savage and bitter wars of independence, over 20,000 French and at least 1 million Algerians died. This was the Algerian War, which lasted from 1954 until 1962.

1 Origins and causes of the Algerian War

Key questions

- What were the main long-term causes of the war?
- What were the main short-term causes of the war?

Overview

- In 1830, France invaded Algeria, forcibly driving many Algerians off the best farmland.
- The French wanted Algeria as a colony for European settlement, as a source of food supplies and cash crops, and as a market for manufactured goods.
- Resistance to the French conquest continued until the 1870s.
- By 1880, there were 300,000 European immigrants (or *colons*), who became known as *pieds noirs*. They came to have a powerful influence in French politics.
- In 1881, Algeria became part of metropolitan France.
- Algerian nationalism took root after the First World War with the formation of several movements, some seeking independence and others wanting more rights while still retaining links with France.
- The *colons* opposed any reforms that would give more rights to Muslim Algerians, and rejected the French government's Violette Plan in 1939.
- During the Second World War, Algeria was controlled by a Vichy administration, until it joined the Free French after an invasion by Allied forces in 1942.
- The experiences of the war, new attitudes towards colonialism and the reluctance of the French to make changes led to the emergence of a more assertive form of nationalism after the Second World War.
- The French government was determined to maintain control of Algeria.
- There was significant political, social and economic inequality between the 1 million *colons* and the 9 million Muslims in post-war Algeria.
- The first violent clash involving Algerian nationalists, at Sétif in May 1945, provoked a harsh response from the French authorities.
- Algerian nationalists formed the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), which was committed to armed struggle to liberate Algeria.
- When FLN guerrillas attacked targets in Algeria on 1 November 1954, the Algerian War began.

Timeline

- 1830** French occupation of Algiers
- 1832** Abd al-Qadir declares *jihad* against the French
- 1847** Abd al-Qadir defeated and exiled, but resistance continues
- 1881** Algeria becomes integral part of France
- 1914–18** 173,000 Algerians fight in French army during First World War
- 1926** formation in Paris of Étoile Nord-Africaine
- 1931** Abdul-Hamid Ben Badis forms Association des Ulema
- 1933** Messali Hadj becomes leader of Étoile Nord-Africaine
- 1936** Popular Front government in France proposes Violette Plan reforms
- 1937** formation of Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA)
- 1939** rejection of Violette Plan by *colons* and Algerian nationalists; outbreak of Second World War
- 1940** establishment of Vichy government in France and pro-Vichy administration in Algeria
- 1941** Atlantic Charter calls for self-determination
- 1942** Allied landings in Algiers; Algerian administration joins Free French
- 1943** Ferhat Abbas and others draw up *Manifeste du Peuple Algérien*
- 1945** violent clashes at Sétif; harsh repression
- 1946** Abbas forms Union Démocratique pour le Manifeste Algérien (UDMA)
- 1947** formation of Organisation Spéciale (forerunner of the FLN)
- 1954** formation of Front de Libération Nationale (FLN); start of the Algerian War

★ The Algerian War

Algeria is the largest country in Africa, but much of the land area is desert; over 90% of the population lives in the northern region, between the Atlas Mountains and the Mediterranean Sea, where nearly all the arable farmlands, cities, towns and transport routes are situated



What were the main long-term causes of the war?

The origins of the war: the French conquest of Algeria

At the beginning of the 19th century, Algeria was part of the Ottoman (or Turkish) Empire, which at the time extended over much of the Middle East and North Africa. However, Turkish control of its North African provinces was nominal only, and the Turkish ruler, or *dey*, administered Algeria with little direct control from Istanbul. Turkish authority was confined mainly to the coastal regions of Algeria, while the Berber and Arab communities to the south remained virtually independent. Although there were frequent raids and warfare between these nomadic and semi-nomadic communities, they had certain things in common – such as the Arabic language, the Islamic religion and some shared cultural practices.

Algeria exported grain and olive oil to France, but disputes over payments for shipments of grain led to strained relations between the two. The 'Barbary pirates', who operated from strongholds on the Algerian coast to attack European shipping in the Mediterranean, were another source of tension. In 1830, the French used the activities of the Barbary pirates as a pretext for invading Algeria. Later French governments supported the colonisation of Algeria for economic reasons – it was valuable as a colony for European settlement, a source of food supplies and cash crops, and a market for manufactured goods from French factories.

The French blockaded the port of Algiers and then landed troops to occupy the city, but the conquest of the rest of Algeria was not as easy. Algerians fought a long and bloody war of resistance. The French army conquered the coastal plain – destroying crops, livestock and villages in a **scorched earth policy**, and moving

scorched earth policy A military strategy of destroying buildings, farmland, infrastructure and all resources so that your enemy cannot use them.

the farmers living there to remote, less fertile areas. It was a brutal conquest, which destroyed the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Algerians. Tens of thousands of French troops, and many more Algerians, were killed in the process.

It was not until the 1870s that France secured control of the coastal and mountain regions. After this, the colonial powers turned their attention to the Saharan region to the south, using 100,000 troops to maintain rule over its sparse, scattered and partly nomadic population. The southern areas remained under military control until the 1940s.

After the conquest of Algeria, France extended its control over the rest of the Maghreb. Tunisia became a French protectorate in 1881 and Morocco in 1912. Although both were now part of the French Empire, these two territories were theoretically under the control of their Arab rulers – the Sultan of Morocco and the Bey of Tunisia. Neither Morocco nor Tunisia became colonies of European settlement to the same extent as Algeria.

Algerian resistance to French colonisation

There was fierce and sustained opposition to the imposition of French rule in Algeria. Historian Kevin Shillington describes it as one of Africa's hardest-fought and most protracted wars of resistance to European colonial conquest in the 19th century. An early struggle against the French occupation was led by **Abd al-Qadir**, who managed to unite the scattered and warring Arab and Berber clans in a *jihād*, or holy war, against the French invaders and their attempts to impose an alien culture, religion and legal system upon Algeria. Although al-Qadir was captured and exiled in 1847, resistance continued for another 30 years. It was only in 1879 that the French finally secured control of the area between the coast and the mountains.

A French settler having his shoes shined alongside Algerian Arab men at a coffee house in Oran, Algeria; this photograph was taken around 1890



Fact

In 1831, the French king Louis Philippe established the *Légion Étrangère*, or Foreign Legion, an army of mercenaries to assist French colonial expansion in Africa. The first headquarters of this tightly disciplined professional force were at Sidi bel Abbès in Algeria, but it also operated in Morocco and other French colonies, as well as fighting for France in both World Wars. The headquarters of the Foreign Legion are now in France, the last Foreign Legion troops having left Algeria in 1968.

Question

Why did the French colonise Algeria?

Abd al-Qadir (1807–83)

Al-Qadir united the Arabs and Berbers into an alliance to resist the French conquest of Algeria. After his surrender in 1847, he spent four years in prison in France before going into exile in Syria. He was later awarded France's highest award, the *Légion d'Honneur*, by Napoleon III for rescuing 12,000 Christians from their attackers in anti-Christian riots in Syria in 1860. Independent Algeria adopted Abd al-Qadir's green and white standard as its national flag.



Algeria as a French colony

The ruthless expulsion of the Algerian population left the coastal region open for European settlement. However, the rate of immigration was not as fast as the French government had hoped. There was a marked increase in the numbers of settlers after 1878, when an outbreak of phylloxera – a vine disease – destroyed French vineyards and many small wine growers from the south of France moved to Algeria, which was known to be suitable for viticulture. By the beginning of the 20th century, wine had become Algeria’s main export, and the production of Algerian wine later exceeded that of France itself.

pieds noirs Literally translated, *pieds noirs* means ‘black feet’. There are various explanations for the origin of the term. Some say that it was invented by the Arabs to describe the French soldiers, who wore black boots. An alternative explanation is that it described the colour of the feet of wine growers in Algeria, tramping grapes to make wine. The most accepted explanation seems to be that it was a reference to the fact that French Algerians had their roots in Africa.

By 1880, there were an estimated 300,000 immigrant settlers in Algeria, only 50% of whom were French. The rest were from Spain, Italy, Malta and elsewhere. Many of the small farmers did not remain on the land, but drifted to the towns and cities, and a few wealthy individuals and companies bought up much of the land. By the end of the 19th century, most of the arable land was in the hands of Europeans, many of whom were absentee landowners living in the towns. Their farms were worked by the dispossessed Algerian peasants, who were poorly paid and highly taxed. The settlers, the *colons* (or colonists), were known as **pieds noirs**. They came to have a very powerful influence in French politics, and no French government was prepared to risk unpopularity by alienating them, as historians Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore explain in Source A.

SOURCE A

Unlike colonists in other parts of the world, the French settlers in Algeria, especially the wealthy ones, were able to keep close touch with their homeland across the Mediterranean. They came to have an influence on French politics out of all proportion to their numbers or real importance.

Oliver, R. and Atmore, A. 2004. *Africa since 1800*. Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press (5th edition). p. 58.

Question

Why was the situation of the *colons* in Algeria different from that of colonists elsewhere?

metropolitan In this context, relating to the home area of a country, rather than its territories overseas.

In 1881, the French government took steps to make Algeria part of France itself, by creating three *départements*, centred on the cities of Algiers, Oran and Constantine, which had growing populations of European settlers. These *départements* were now considered to be part of **metropolitan** France, although the southern part of Algeria remained under military control. Some historians interpret the move to integrate Algeria into France as an attempt by the French government to compensate for lost prestige and territory in the Franco–Prussian War (1870–71), when France was forced to cede the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to Prussia. Under French rule, the cities and towns of Algeria grew rapidly, not only as a result of European immigration but also due to the influx of impoverished Algerians moving to the cities in a bid for survival, after being driven off their lands.



Question

What were the implications of Algeria being considered part of metropolitan France rather than a French colony?

7

A map showing western Europe and north-west Africa

There was a marked contrast between the vineyards, olive groves and green fields of commercial crops, where French settlers prospered, and the areas to which Algerians had been forced to move to make way for them, which were over-grazed, dry and prone to erosion. Muslim inhabitants of Algeria were considered to be French subjects but not French citizens, and they were treated as alien and inferior. Their language, Arabic, was replaced by French as the official language, and French law replaced Islamic law. Muslims had no political rights, were highly taxed and were subject to strict regulations that limited their freedom of movement.

The rise of the nationalist movement

The Algerian nationalist movement had its origins in the First World War, when 173,000 Algerians fought in the French army and thousands more helped the war effort by working in French factories. They were exposed to the workings of democracy, which were taken for granted in France but were not applied to the Muslim majority in Algeria. After the war, poverty and unemployment drove thousands more Algerians to seek work in France, where wages were low and working and living conditions poor.



Theory of knowledge

History and ethics

Colonialism is often seen simply as a process of political conquest and economic domination. But it also involved cultural imperialism and psychological oppression. Colonial powers imposed their own languages and customs, and indigenous knowledge systems were regarded as primitive and inferior. Discuss the ethical implications of colonialism, taking into account its political, economic, cultural and psychological aspects.

Messali Hadj (1898–1974)

Hadj came from a working-class background and had little formal education. He served in the French army during the First World War and then worked in France, where he briefly joined the Communist Party. After his return to Algeria he was imprisoned and exiled several times, and became the best known and most outspoken of the early nationalist leaders. Many of his socialist ideas influenced the FLN, which ruled post-independence Algeria.

Ferhat Abbas (1899–1985)

Abbas came from a middle-class background and trained as a pharmacist. He was a strong supporter of assimilation, and in his youth spoke French more easily than he did Arabic. His support for moderate policies and continuing links with France changed after the Second World War in the face of the uncompromising attitude of the *pieds noirs* towards reform, and the harsh repression of protest.

assimilation This was a policy used in many French colonies. The idea was that once Africans or Asians adopted the French language, culture, customs and traditions, they would be assimilated as French citizens with all the rights and privileges that this involved. In practice, though, there were many obstacles. By 1936, only 2500 Muslim Algerians had qualified for French citizenship.

During the 1920s and 1930s, three strands of Algerian nationalism developed. The most revolutionary of them started among migrant workers in France. A young Algerian nationalist, **Messali Hadj**, emerged as leader of a movement called the *Étoile Nord-Africaine* (North African Star), which aimed to protect the rights of these migrant workers. It soon had thousands of members. As well as demanding better working conditions in France, they also had political goals for Algeria: freedom of the press, establishment of Arabic schools, confiscation of large estates, a parliament elected by universal suffrage, and independence for Algeria. Many of them took these ideas back home on their return. When Messali Hadj returned to Algeria in 1937, he formed the Party of the Algerian People (*Parti du Peuple Algérien*, or PPA), which tried to mobilise urban workers and peasant farmers, but was soon banned by the French authorities.

Another group was led by the moderate **Ferhat Abbas**, who wanted equality for Muslim Algerians as French citizens, a goal that was consistent with the French policy of ‘**assimilation**’. He called for agricultural reforms and the abolition of special privileges for the *pieds noirs*. Many of the moderate liberals who supported his ideas were in favour of maintaining links with France, but wanted more rights for Muslim Algerians.

The third group that helped to inspire the birth of Algerian nationalism was a religious movement called the *Association des Ulema*, led by **Abdul-Hamid Ben Badis** (see page 9). Conservative in outlook, Ben Badis believed that Algerian nationalism could only succeed with a return to the principles of Islam. Although the *Ulema* movement was significant in stirring up a sense of religious and national consciousness among Algerians, it did not play a practical political role in the growth of resistance.

The *pieds noirs* rejected any kind of reform, even those suggested by moderates such as Abbas. Liberals in the French government who supported reform were confronted by the stubborn opposition of the *pieds noirs* and their powerful political allies in France. However, when a Popular Front government led by the socialist Léon Blum came to power in 1936, it was more sympathetic to the notion of reform. The result was the 1939 *Violette Plan*, named after the French minister of state responsible for it. He proposed the extension of French citizenship with full political rights to certain categories of Algerian Muslims, including army officers, elected officials, university graduates and professionals. Abbas and other moderates welcomed the plan as a step towards achieving their aims, but Messali Hadj rejected it as a new ‘instrument of colonialism’ designed ‘to split the Algerian people by separating the *élite* from the masses’. Although the plan would have granted immediate French citizenship to only about 21,000 Algerians, with a provision to add a few thousand each year, the *pieds noirs* rejected it and created so many objections and obstacles that it was never implemented. Disillusioned by its failure, Abbas moved his support from the concept of assimilation to the goal of a Muslim Algeria, associated with France but sustaining its own culture, language and traditions.

Algeria during the Second World War

When the Second World War broke out in Europe in 1939, it involved the overseas empires of the European colonial powers as well. Over 80,000 African troops were sent from French West Africa to help to defend France against the German invasion. Many Algerians also volunteered to fight for France. However, when France surrendered to Nazi Germany in 1940, the colonial officials in

North Africa and West Africa declared their loyalty to the collaborationist **Vichy government**. The *pieds noirs* were generally sympathetic to the new pro-Vichy administration, but it increased difficulties for Muslims in Algeria, and posed a threat to the Algerian Jewish population when it enforced the harsh anti-Semitic laws that became a feature of wartime France.

During the war, North Africa became an important area of conflict between the Allied and Axis armies, and between 1940 and 1943 there was fierce fighting in Ethiopia, Libya and Tunisia. To help the Allied armies, the United States and Britain landed troops in Morocco and Algeria in 1942. At this stage, the colonial authorities in Algeria abandoned their support for the Vichy government, and switched their support to the **Free French** (see page 10). Using Algeria as a base, the Allied forces proceeded to defeat the Axis armies in North Africa, and then fight against them in Italy, where many Algerians served with distinction.

In 1943, Ferhat Abbas and other nationalist leaders drew up a document called the *Manifeste du Peuple Algérien* (Manifesto of the Algerian People), calling for a constitution that would guarantee equality for all Algerians, land reform, the recognition of Arabic as an official language, the participation of Muslims in government and the liberation of political prisoners. The Free French leader de Gaulle and the newly appointed governor of Algeria, Georges Catroux, recognised the need for some sort of reform, but they were not prepared to concede to these demands. They proposed instead a reform package based on the Violette Plan. Even moderates rejected this proposal as inadequate. Ferhat Abbas, Messali Hadj and other leaders joined together to form the Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (*Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté*, or AML) to work for independence. Large numbers of supporters of the banned PPA joined the AML, which established a newspaper – *Égalité* – that soon had 500,000 subscribers.

By 1945, there was growing unrest, aggravated by food shortages and unemployment. The AML organised demonstrations in many towns to demand the release from jail of Messali Hadj, and independence for Algeria. As the end of the war approached, there were increasing tensions and unrest.

What were the main short-term causes of the war?

The impact of the Second World War on Africa

The Second World War had a significant impact on Africa and on attitudes towards colonialism. African soldiers who had been part of the Allied struggle to ‘make the world safe for democracy’ returned home questioning why the ideals for which they had been fighting did not extend to the colonies. They were no longer willing to accept colonial rule, and many former soldiers played leading roles in the independence struggles. During the war, the Allied leaders Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had drawn up a document called the Atlantic Charter, in which they pledged their support for **self-determination**. In addition to this, after the horrors of Nazi race policies had been exposed in the death camps, world opinion became increasingly critical of racism and of colonialism, which was based on assumptions of racial superiority. Another factor that contributed to the changing world order was the newly formed United Nations (UN), which proclaimed its commitment to upholding human rights and promoting self-determination.

Abdul-Hamid Ben Badis (1889–1940)

Ben Badis wanted to save Algerian culture from being eclipsed by French cultural and moral values. In 1930, he founded the Association des Ulema, a group of Islamic scholars with different and sometimes opposing viewpoints, but with a common purpose of reforming Islamic practice in Algeria. Ben Badis was seen as Algeria’s foremost Islamic scholar and is still regarded as a national hero in Algeria.



Vichy government During the Second World War, the northern part of France was under German occupation. The southern part, with its capital at Vichy, was ruled by a French government in collaboration with the Nazis. The right-wing Vichy government, led by Marshal Pétain, imprisoned or interned over 200,000 people, deported 76,000 Jews, and sent 650,000 French workers to Germany.

self-determination The right of all people to choose their own form of government. This became a key demand of African and Asian independence movements after the Second World War.

Question

How was Algeria affected by the Second World War?

Free French Led by General Charles de Gaulle, the Free French group rejected the Vichy government as not representing the French people, and formed a government in exile. The French colonies in Equatorial Africa declared their support for the 'Free French' government in exile, and for a while Brazzaville became the capital of 'Free France'. At one time, more than half the soldiers in the Free French army came from the French African colonies.

All of these factors led to the growth of a more assertive spirit of nationalism in Algeria. Nationalists had seen France defeated and occupied by Nazi Germany, and they were influenced by the new ideas questioning the legitimacy of colonialism in the post-war world, and specifically by their impact on Africa. They were more determined than ever to push for independence rather than reform.

The war also affected the colonial powers. The success of the Japanese armies in defeating the French, British and Dutch in Southeast Asia destroyed the myth of 'white supremacy'. The European powers were seriously weakened by the war, both economically and politically. This caused changes in attitudes towards their colonial empires. But while the British were prepared to grant independence to India and other colonies, the French chose another approach.

French colonial policy after the Second World War

After 1945, the French government was determined to recover as much of its pre-war colonial empire as possible. This was partly for economic reasons and partly an attempt to restore some of the international prestige that had been lost as a result of the Nazi defeat and occupation of France during the war. In contrast, therefore, to other European colonial powers, France fought two bitter – and unsuccessful – wars to maintain control of its colonies in Indochina and Algeria.

French determination to retain control of Algeria was based on a combination of factors: the notion that Algeria was part of France itself, rather than a colony; the heavy investments that had been made in Algerian mining and agriculture; and the presence of a million French settlers throughout the country. The disproportionately powerful influence of the pro-pied noir lobby in France also ensured that any French support for reform or change in Algeria was crushed, as historian Martin Meredith explains:

SOURCE B

In the turbulent postwar era, as a succession of French governments struggled to survive amid strikes, inflation, austerity and a debilitating war in Indo-China, none was willing to risk antagonising the pied noir population and their supporters for the sake of reform in Algeria. Moderate Algerian nationalists were consequently given short shrift.

Meredith, M. 2005. The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. Johannesburg, South Africa. Jonathan Ball Publishers. p. 45.

There were additional economic and strategic factors that influenced French policy. In the 1950s, vast oil and natural gas deposits were discovered in the Algerian Sahara, and the potential of the previously undervalued desert regions

Activity

Compare and contrast the views expressed in this source with the views in Source A on page 6.

began to emerge. According to historian Ivan Hrbek, France's political decisions were considerably influenced by the dream of having an independent oil supply. Benjamin Stora, a leading French historian of the Algerian War, believes that the desire of the French government to use the Sahara for its first nuclear experiments was another factor that influenced French policy.

Algeria after the Second World War

The population of Algeria in the post-war years was about 9 million – 1 million pieds noirs and 8 million Muslim Algerians. Both groups sent deputies to the National Assembly in Paris, but each group had 15 representatives, which meant that Muslim Algerians were grossly under-represented. The pieds noirs could also rely on the support of other political groups in France, as well as influential interest groups in commerce, banking and the press. This gave them a powerful position in French politics. They also dominated the political sphere in Algeria itself: in the upper levels of the administration, Muslims held only eight out of more than 800 higher-level posts. The pieds noirs largely directed Algerian commerce and agriculture as well: they owned 30% of the arable land, including the most fertile areas, and controlled the export trade in wine, citrus fruit, olives and vegetables. In 1954, 79% of pieds noirs had been born in Algeria, and so had a vested interest in ensuring continued European control. Many of them felt that they were not French but Algerian, and so did not want to live in France, but at the same time they wanted to preserve their privileged position in colonial Algeria.

However, Benjamin Stora points out that the pieds noirs were not a homogeneous group. They were not all wealthy landowners: many were government employees, industrial workers, artisans or merchants. Over 70% of them had an income and standard of living that was 15–20% lower than the average for people living in metropolitan France. However, according to Stora, they were 'unanimous in defending their privileges, which made the most insignificant French government employee superior to any Arab', and they were united in their 'shared fear of the Muslim majority'. These attitudes informed their strong opposition to any demands for reform or equality in Algeria.

The majority of Muslim Algerians were poor, illiterate and unemployed. Many of those in urban areas lived in slums on the outskirts of the big cities like Algiers. There was great rural poverty, too, as well as dwindling food resources. The increasing area of land under vines, producing wines for export, meant that less land was available for food production to support the rapidly growing population. To escape rural unemployment and poverty, more and more Algerians moved to the cities or to France to find work. By the mid 1950s, about 300,000 Algerians – one in every seven adult men – were working in France.

Muslim Algerians were treated as an inferior race, and were subject to discrimination and prejudice. The authorities allowed the use of the Arabic language only in religious schools. Although they had representation in the Algerian Assembly (where half of the representatives were European and half were Muslim), many historians, including Hrbek, Meredith, Horne and Stora, state quite categorically that the administration rigged the elections to ensure that only moderate Muslims who supported colonial rule were elected.

There was a huge social and economic gap between the two communities, which was reflected in the great inequality in the distribution of income in 1955, as shown in the table below.

	Population		Percentage of national income
	Millions	%	
Non-Muslims	1.0	10	47
Muslims – rural	5.3	55	18
Muslims – non-rural	3.4	35	35

From Mazrui, A. 2003. *General History of Africa: Volume 8: Africa since 1935*. Cape Town, South Africa. New Africa Books/UNESCO. p. 134.

Historical interpretation

The Algerian historian Mahfoud Kaddache describes the French reaction after Sétif as a ‘war of reprisals’, and the French historian Benjamin Stora refers to it as a ‘massacre’. British historian Alistair Horne believes that ‘the shots fired at Sétif represented the first volley of the Algerian War’.

Post-war protests and repression

The first encounter between Algerian nationalists and French authorities took place on 8 May 1945 – VE Day – when France was celebrating the Allied victory over Nazi Germany. In the town of Sétif, the police clashed with marchers who were carrying flags and banners bearing the green and white colours of the Algerian nationalist movement. The violence spread, and over 100 Europeans were killed in attacks. The harsh response by the *pieds noirs* and the French authorities resulted in the deaths of at least 15,000 Algerians, although some historians put the figure much higher, and Algerian nationalists claimed that 45,000 died.

Villages were bombed by the air force and navy, and civilians were rounded up and shot. The AML was outlawed and over 5000 Muslims, including moderate leaders like Abbas, were arrested. Many moderate Algerians were outraged by the French reaction.

Question

Why was the Sétif massacre a turning point in relations between the Algerians and the French?

SOURCE C

Kateb Yacine, an Algerian liberal poet, recalls the effect that the French reaction had on him.

It was at Sétif that my sense of humanity was affronted for the first time by the most atrocious sights. I was sixteen years old. The shock which I felt at the pitiless butchery that caused the deaths of thousands of Muslims, I have never forgotten. From that moment my nationalism took definite form.

Quoted in Horne, A. 2006. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. New York, USA. New York Review Books. p. 27.

The harsh repression resulted in a heightened sense of nationalism, and several new movements were formed. Abbas formed the Union Démocratique pour le Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) and called for a free, secular and republican Algeria, loosely federated with France, while Messali Hadj repeated his demand for complete independence, with no links to France.

In 1947, militant leaders formed the Organisation Spéciale, dedicated to armed struggle to win independence for Algeria. Among the founder members was Ahmed Ben Bella, who was to become the first leader of an independent Algeria (see page 34). However, during this period, the attention of the French government was focused on the situation in Indochina, where the Viet Minh were waging a war of resistance, and it failed to recognise the significance of the growth of Algerian nationalism.

In an attempt to diffuse the tense situation, the French government introduced some reforms, despite opposition from the *pieds noirs*. The reforms recognised Arabic as an official language along with French, and made provision for elected local councils. The government also created an Algerian Assembly, to which Muslims and Europeans could each elect 60 representatives. This meant that 90% of the population had the same representation as 10%. In addition, Europeans had a universal franchise, while Muslims had to qualify to vote. In the subsequent elections and those that followed in 1951, the *pieds noirs* manipulated the election results to exclude critical Muslim representatives. This happened to such an extent that the term *élection algérienne* was cynically used as a term for a rigged election.

These developments did not satisfy the emergent nationalist movement. In Cairo in 1954, Ben Bella and others formed the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), which planned an armed uprising to rid Algeria of French control. While some of the leaders in Cairo focused on developing external support and acquiring arms and funds, others began to build up a military network in Algeria.

The outbreak of war in 1954

The uprising began on 1 November 1954, when small groups of FLN guerrillas attacked military and government installations, police posts, the radio station and telephone exchange, and French warehouses in different parts of Algeria. According to Meredith, they had strict instructions to avoid European civilian casualties. In a radio broadcast from Cairo, FLN leaders called on Algerians to join in the struggle for an independent Algeria.

In Paris, the French government was still reeling from the unexpected loss of Indochina only six months earlier – the result of a humiliating defeat by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu – and was determined that this outcome would not be repeated in Algeria. The French prime minister, Pierre Mendès France, declared in the French National Assembly: ‘The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably French ... Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession.’ The French were prepared to go to war to retain control of Algeria. The result was nearly eight years of bitter fighting.



Theory of knowledge

How history is taught

Read the article entitled ‘Colonial abuses haunt France’, written at the time of the 60th anniversary of the Sétif massacre, on this website:

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4552473.stm>

Explain briefly how the law passed in France in 2005 would affect the way the Algerian War is taught in French schools, and why historians are concerned about this.

End of unit activities

- 1 Research and debate: work in groups of four. Each student should research the role played by one of the historical figures listed below, and then debate whose role was most important in developing a sense of resistance, identity or nationalism among Algerians:
 - Abd al-Qadir
 - Abdul Hamid Ben Badis
 - Messali Hadj
 - Ferhat Abbas
- 2 Design a spider diagram to illustrate the reasons why France wanted to maintain control of Algeria after the Second World War.
- 3 Draw up a table to summarise the role played by each of these movements in Algeria. Use the table below as a guide.

Movement	Circumstances under which it was formed	What it wanted for Algeria
Étoile Nord-Africaine		
Association des Ulema		
Parti du Peuple Algérien		
Union Démocratique pour le Manifeste Algérien		
Organisation Spéciale		
Front de Libération Nationale		

- 4 Write a feature for a newspaper in 1950, contrasting the lifestyles of pieds noirs and Muslim Algerians after the Second World War.
- 5 ‘The French government, not the pied noir community, should be blamed for the outbreak of the Algerian War.’
Divide into two groups. One group should work out an argument to support the statement above, and the other an argument to oppose it.
- 6 Design a spider diagram to summarise the long-term and short-term causes of the Algerian War.

2 Nature and practice of the Algerian War

Key questions

- What was the nature of the Algerian War?
- What were the main events of the war?
- What strategies, tactics and technology were used?
- How were civilians involved in the war?
- What was the role of resistance and revolution?
- What was the reaction to the war in France?

Overview

- The Algerian War was a war of national liberation, and also a civil war that created deep divisions in French and Algerian societies.
- Algerian nationalists in the FLN wanted independence from France, but the *pieds noirs* backed by the French army wanted to prevent this.
- The war began in 1954 with FLN guerrilla attacks on civilian targets, followed by harsh reprisals from the French army. The scale of the war escalated until there was fighting throughout Algeria.
- The most intensely fought clash was the 1957 Battle of Algiers, during which the French public first became aware of the use of torture by the army.
- Backed by the French army and *pieds noirs*, who believed he would follow policies to win the war for France, Charles de Gaulle became president of France in 1958.
- De Gaulle's decision to recognise Algeria's right to self-determination and to negotiate with the FLN caused a right-wing backlash from the *pieds noirs* and sections of the army.
- The French had the advantage of modern weapons, air and naval power, and overwhelming numbers; they almost succeeded in destroying the military capability of the FLN inside Algeria.
- The FLN used classic guerrilla tactics and had the support of the local population, as well as sympathy from the international community.
- Algerian civilians played a crucial role in supporting the FLN at the risk of ruthless French reprisals, which forcibly removed 2 million villagers and placed them in internment camps.
- The French decision to end the war and withdraw from Algeria was influenced by growing criticism of the war at home, lack of success in crushing nationalist resistance, and changing views on France's role as a colonial power.
- Pied noir extremists and mutinous army generals established the OAS to wage a war of terror and prevent an Algerian victory.
- The war ended with the signing of the Evian Accords in March 1962.

Timeline

- 1954 Nov** FLN attacks across Algeria
- 1955 Aug** widespread massacres and reprisals at Philippeville
- 1956 Mar** independence for Morocco and Tunisia
- Aug** conference of FLN leaders in Soummam Valley, Kabylia
- Oct** France hijacks aircraft carrying Ben Bella and other FLN leaders
- 1957 Jan** start of Battle of Algiers
- 1958 Feb** French air force bombs refugee camp at Sakiet, Tunisia
- Mar–May** Battle of the Mordice Line
- Sep** formation of Provisional Government for Algeria (GPRA) led by Ferhat Abbas
- Dec** de Gaulle becomes president of France
- 1959 Jul (until Mar 1960)** 80,000 Algerians forcibly resettled
- Sep** de Gaulle proclaims Algeria's right to self-determination
- 1960 Jan** 'Barricades Week' protest by 2000 armed *colons* in Algiers
- Sep** publication of the 'Manifesto of the 121' by French intellectuals opposed to the war
- Dec** UN recognises Algeria's right to independence
- 1961 Jan** formation of extremist Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS)
- Apr** attempted coup by generals in Algiers
- Oct** massacre in Paris of 200 anti-OAS Algerian protestors
- 1962 Feb** Charonne metro station massacre
- Mar** Evian Accords – ceasefire in Algeria
- Jul** official French recognition of Algerian independence

Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)

A nationalist political movement formed in Cairo in 1954, with the aim of achieving independence for Algeria. The Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) was the armed wing of the FLN. Most historians, however, simply refer to both collectively as the FLN.

harkis These were Algerian soldiers who fought in the French army during the Algerian War – some for economic reasons, and some to avenge family members killed by the FLN. After the war, the French disarmed them and left them to their fate in Algeria, despite their pleas to be taken to France. As many as 150,000 of them were killed following independence, sometimes in circumstances of extreme cruelty. About 50,000 of them reached France, where they lived in poor conditions in refugee camps for many years. In 2001, they and their descendants filed a lawsuit against the French government for crimes against humanity, and in the same year President Jacques Chirac publicly paid tribute to them.

What was the nature of the Algerian War?

At its simplest level, the Algerian War was a war of national liberation: Algerians fighting for political independence from a colonial power that was reluctant to recognise their country's sovereignty. In this struggle, resistance and revolution played vital roles in motivating the Algerian population. This war of liberation was a classic guerrilla war. The nationalist movement, the guerrillas of the **Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)**, never numbered more than 40,000 in Algeria at any one time, but they were supported and supplied by the civilian population, and able to escape across the border to safe havens in Tunisia and Morocco. They were fighting against regular French forces, which at the height of the war numbered 500,000 troops. During the war, between 1954 and 1962, over 2 million French soldiers served in Algeria, many of them conscripts.

However, this view of the war overlooks a complex range of other struggles. One-tenth of the population of Algeria were white settlers, the *pieds noirs* , who did not want independence from France. They waged war against Muslim Algerians, and against the French government itself when the latter finally agreed to negotiate with the Algerians. They were assisted in this by mutinous French army generals, who staged an abortive coup to seize power. Some right-wing generals went on to form a violent vigilante army, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS), with extremists amongst the *pieds noirs* . In the words of Nigerian historian E. A. Ayandele, the war was 'bitter, bloody and racist'.

There were also complex divisions within Algerian and French societies. In Algeria, the FLN fought bitterly against the **harkis** – those Algerians who supported the French and were regarded as traitors to their own people. In another complexity, not all *pieds noirs* supported the war against their fellow Algerians, and there were some among them who worked for the FLN. In France, there were fierce ideological and political battles between supporters of the *pieds noirs* and liberals critical of their government's policies. In Paris, hundreds of demonstrators died in protests against the war and OAS violence that were brutally suppressed by the police.

The Algerian War was one of extraordinary brutality, and all sides were guilty of committing atrocities. FLN guerrillas murdered French civilians and Muslims suspected of supporting them, and mutilated their bodies. French army reprisals against the Algerian civilian population were savage. The use of torture by the French army during the Battle of Algiers in 1957 provoked outrage, both internationally and at home in France. Critics likened their actions to the methods used by the Gestapo during the Nazi occupation of France. In the final stages of the war, the OAS targeted the French as well as Algerians in vicious attacks.

French police guarding a group of suspects in Algiers, April 1956



The tragedy of the war and its impact on Algerian civilians, as well as on young French conscripts, is symbolised in this memory of a young French soldier about his time in Kabylia, a poor rural area of Algeria where the fighting between the French and the FLN was particularly bitter.

SOURCE A

An incident related by Georges Mattei, who served in Algeria in 1956. As a young boy during the Second World War and the Nazi occupation of France, he had lived with his uncle, who was a member of the French Resistance against the Nazis.

You have to remember that I am Corsican and that there is a physical resemblance between people from Kabylia and Corsica. One day my unit was sent to a village. We put the older people, women and children on one side, then the young men on the other whom we started to interrogate about the FLN. I was put on guard duty on the outskirts of the village with two other soldiers. Suddenly in the distance I saw an old man walking towards us, and you know in appearance he was just like my grandad. The two other soldiers were immediately aggressive with him – but I stepped in and asked him what he wanted. He told me he was worried about his son. He had heard that he had been picked up by the French army and he had some bread and cakes for him. ‘He is about your age’ he told me. I went away to see if we were still holding his son. After about twenty minutes I realised that we had taken him away that morning and shot him ... I felt like a Nazi.

Quoted in Evans, M. ‘French Resistance and the Algerian War’. History Today. 30 June 1991. Volume 41, issue 7. <http://www.historytoday.com/martin-evans/french-resistance-and-algerian-war>.

The war was fought against the background of the Cold War. Egypt’s success at the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956 meant that arms could be supplied to the FLN from the Soviet Union and China through Egypt. French military strategists sometimes liked to emphasise a dangerous link between the Algerian nationalist movement and the advance of communism in the Third World. However, the Cold War did not play a significant role in the Algerian War, and although the FLN supported socialist economic policies, it had no intention of coming under Soviet domination.

What were the main events of the war?

The beginning of the war, 1954

After the FLN attacks on 1 November 1954, the French authorities believed that they were dealing with a few isolated incidents rather than a general uprising. Nevertheless, the French government quickly sent paratroop regiments to Algeria, and made hundreds of security police available to root out resistance.



Theory of knowledge

Historical evidence and emotion

A personal account such as the one in Source A can evoke a powerful emotional response. Why does a primary source often have a more emotive impact than a secondary source? What value and what limitations do primary sources have as historical evidence?

There were mass arrests, and hundreds of Muslims were imprisoned, including moderate leaders who did not support the concept of an armed struggle. Within two weeks, the FLN network in Algiers had been broken up. The army sent expeditions into the Aurès Mountains to search for guerrilla strongholds, and ruthlessly destroyed villages, looking for any signs of support for the guerrillas. By the end of the year, it appeared as if all resistance had been crushed and life seemingly returned to normal for the *Pieds noirs*.

collective punishment Also known as ‘collective responsibility’, this involves punishing a whole community for the actions of a few.

Violent attacks and savage reprisals, 1955–56

The FLN renewed its attacks early in 1955, this time targeting Muslim officials who worked for the French administration in Algeria. Hundreds were tortured and murdered, and their bodies mutilated. French reprisals were harsh – they implemented **collective punishment** against whole villages and interned thousands of suspects.

In August 1955, the FLN stepped up its campaign, this time targeting European civilians. In the city of Philippeville and the surrounding area, 71 *Pieds noirs* were killed, many of them attacked in their homes or dragged from their cars. French reprisals were once again severe, and *Pied noir* vigilante groups randomly executed Muslims. Official French figures put the numbers killed at 1273, but the FLN claimed that they had proof of 12,000 casualties. In the words of historian Martin Meredith, Algeria ‘descended into an inferno of violence, an endless cycle of repression and revenge’. After the harsh repression that followed the Philippeville killings, moderate Algerians like Ferhat Abbas came to the conclusion that compromise was no longer possible. Abbas declared his support for the FLN, saying that he was withdrawing from ‘ineffectual politics’ and supporting the liberation struggle. In August 1956, the FLN organised its first congress, which was held in secret in the Soummam valley in Kabylia, Algeria, and was attended by 200 delegates. They developed a framework for a future independent state and discussed plans to accelerate the guerrilla campaign to put European civilians, officials and police ‘in constant fear for their lives’, according to historians Martin Alexander and J. F. V. Keiger.

Determined to maintain control of Algeria at all costs, the French government reassessed its policies towards neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia. Nationalist movements in these French protectorates were demanding independence, too. Neither had been the focus of French settlement and investment to the same extent that Algeria had, and they were not considered to be an integral part of France itself. The smaller settler populations – numbering 400,000 and 250,000 respectively – did not have the same influence on French politics that the Algerian *colons* had. Despite the opposition of European settlers, France recognised the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in March 1956. From then onwards, FLN guerrillas were able to seek sanctuary across the borders of these two countries.

The French government now focused its resources on crushing the uprising in Algeria. The period of military service for French conscripts was increased to 27 months, and more troops were stationed in Algeria. In October 1956, the army forced a Moroccan civilian aircraft carrying the FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella to land in Algeria. Ben Bella was subsequently imprisoned without trial for five years. The kidnapping of Ben Bella provoked international criticism of France, and crucially caused Morocco and Tunisia to become more committed to support for the FLN.

Question

What advantages did the French have over the Algerians when the war started?

The battle of Algiers, 1957

In 1957, the focus of the war shifted to Algiers. The FLN called for a general strike, which was so well supported that it affected commerce and manufacturing throughout Algeria. FLN urban commandos also placed bombs in bars and cafés used by off-duty officials, soldiers and police, as well as by the pied noir community. To counter this increase in the number of attacks on civilian targets, the French authorities handed over control of the city to the military. French troops sealed off Muslim areas behind barbed-wire barricades and conducted house-to-house searches in the Casbah, the crowded Muslim heart of the old city. Thousands of suspects were arrested and taken to detention centres, where many were brutally tortured. Over 3000 Algerians died in custody during this period.

Historian Guy Arnold believes that although the extensive use of torture by the French may have given them information to help the army win battles, in the process they lost the struggle to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Algerian people. News about what was happening leaked out, despite secrecy and censorship. Some French officials resigned in protest, and there were growing concerns in France itself about the nature of French actions in Algeria.

However, from the immediate French perspective, these brutal tactics were successful. FLN bomb factories and arms stores were destroyed, and the number of attacks dropped substantially. The September arrest of Saadi Yacef, the main FLN leader in Algiers, effectively ended the Battle of Algiers. Over 24,000 people had been arrested and many thousands had died.

A still from the 1966 film Battle of Algiers, showing French troops marching into Algiers to the cheers of colonial sympathisers



Theory of knowledge

History and ethics

The use of torture has become an issue of contemporary concern in the 21st century. Why do you think this is? Can the use of torture ever be justified? Who should be held accountable for it – those who give the orders or those who commit acts of physical violence?

Fact

Maurice Audin, a young mathematics lecturer at the University of Algiers and a member of the Algerian Communist Party, was one of many people who disappeared during the Battle of Algiers. The army claimed that he had been shot while trying to escape, but the French historian Pierre Vidal-Naquet believes that he died while being tortured. His body has never been found. In 2007, on the 50th anniversary of his disappearance, his widow wrote to President Sarkozy of France, asking that the mystery of her husband's death be investigated. In 2009, his daughter, Michèle Audin, also a mathematician, publicly declined to accept France's highest award – the *Légion d'Honneur* – for her work, because of the lack of response by the government to her mother's letter.

In an attempt to cut off the FLN guerrillas from reinforcements and supplies, the French army constructed an electrically charged wire barricade along the border between Algeria and Tunisia. Despite this, guerrilla operations continued, though on a smaller scale.

Political changes in France and hope of freedom for Algeria, 1958–59

Throughout its duration, the Algerian War dominated French domestic politics, and caused the fall of six prime ministers and the collapse of the Fourth Republic. Opinion in France was divided between those who were horrified by French actions in Algeria and favoured a negotiated settlement with the nationalists, and right-wing groups who supported the *pieds noirs* and wanted to escalate the war until a French victory was secured. A series of weak governments in Paris was unwilling to risk losing support, and so handed over more power and responsibility to the generals in Algeria. Suspicious of the intentions of the French government, the *pieds noirs* formed a Committee of Public Safety with army leaders in Algeria.

The French army became increasingly impatient with the way the government was conducting the war, and placed their hopes on France's wartime hero – the leader of the Free French, Charles de Gaulle. Senior officers in Algeria demanded the return of de Gaulle, whom they hoped would win the war for France. He became prime minister and then president, instituting the Fifth Republic to replace the unpopular Fourth Republic, which had been crippled by a series of weak governments as well as the humiliation of defeat in Indochina.

De Gaulle had a difficult task ahead: according to historians Roland Oliver and Anthony Atmore, he was faced with 'right-wing generals, embattled settlers, and reactionary administrators'. However, contrary to the expectations of the army generals, de Gaulle did not share their view that Algeria should remain French at all costs. He believed, along with most people in France by that time, that it was futile to try to maintain control of Algeria by force. He realised that there were other, more important, issues for France to deal with – such as its role in Europe and its relationship with the emerging 'Third World'.

De Gaulle's government made a final attempt to win over Algerians to support a continuing link with France. This was the 1958 Constantine Plan, which aimed to industrialise the Algerian economy and create employment. However, the plan failed in its attempt to weaken support for the nationalist movement, which in September 1958 formed a government-in-exile, the *Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne* (GPRA), under the leadership of Ferhat Abbas, with offices in Tunis and Cairo. This government was recognised by all the Arab and communist states.

In 1959, de Gaulle decided to negotiate. He recognised the right of Algerians to self-determination, and offered three options: total secession, integration with France, or a degree of self-government in association with France. He made it clear that he believed that secession would bring poverty, political chaos, widespread killing and communist dictatorship. However, he announced that a referendum would be held on the issue within four years after peace was restored.

The right-wing backlash in Algeria, 1960–61

The *pieds noirs* believed that in conceding the right of Algerians to determine their own future, the government – especially de Gaulle – was betraying them.

They were incensed when de Gaulle referred for the first time to *Algérie algérienne* (Algerian Algeria), discarding the myth of *Algérie française* (French Algeria) that France had claimed for more than a century. In January 1960, extremists among the pied noir community attempted to seize power in Algeria, expecting the army to join them. They set up barricades in the street in what became known as 'Barricades Week', but the attempted uprising failed without support from the army.

When de Gaulle visited Algeria in December 1960, he was faced with demonstrations and riots by the pieds noirs in Algiers and Oran. The Muslim community used the opportunity of his visit to demonstrate its support for the FLN, leaving no doubt that the FLN was more than a minority terrorist group, as many French had chosen to believe.

In April 1961, four right-wing army generals (including General Salan, former commander-in-chief of the French army in Algeria) made an unsuccessful attempt to seize power in Algeria to prevent the French government from proceeding with plans to grant independence. The coup failed after four days, but dissident army officers joined with pied noir extremists to establish a secret organisation, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète, or OAS, which used terrorist tactics in a desperate attempt to prevent a settlement that would result in an independent Algeria with a Muslim majority government. They targeted the French army and made indiscriminate attacks on the Muslim population, hoping to provoke FLN reprisals that would force the army to intervene to restore order. In this way, they hoped to destroy de Gaulle's policy.

Months of terror and violence followed, and the gulf between the Muslim and European population widened. The bombings and terror campaign of the OAS extended to metropolitan France, where several attempts were made to assassinate de Gaulle.

The end of the war and victory for the nationalist movement, 1962

Negotiations between the French government and representatives of the FLN were protracted and broke down on several occasions. One obstacle was the French government's bid to retain control of the Sahara region, with its recently discovered oil reserves. Understandably, the FLN refused to consider this.

As the peace talks progressed, and the OAS made frantic efforts to derail them, levels of violence in Algeria increased. Attacks against civilians included planting booby-trapped cars in Muslim neighbourhoods, and holding up banks and businesses in an effort to get funds. Violence also escalated in metropolitan France, where the OAS planted explosive devices – in a two-week period in January, there were nearly 50 such explosions in the Paris region alone.

Finally, on 18 March 1962, the two sides reached an agreement at Evian in France. They announced a ceasefire and a referendum to decide on the future of Algeria. The agreement was approved by 90% of French voters in a referendum held in April, and by 99.7% of voters in a referendum in Algeria on 1 July. However, the Evian Accords did not bring an end to the violence in Algeria, and a further 150,000 European and Muslim Algerians died in the months before independence. On 3 July 1962, Algeria became independent, and the government in exile returned to Algiers. More than a million pieds noirs left Algeria in a mass exodus, abandoning their homes, farms and businesses.

Fact

There were at least 30 plots to assassinate Charles de Gaulle, nearly all of them resulting from his decision to grant independence to Algeria, and most of them planned by the OAS. The most famous of these was the Petit-Clamart ambush of August 1962 in Paris, when de Gaulle survived a barrage of machine-gun fire. This incident became the subject of a 1969 novel by Frederick Forsyth, *The Day of the Jackal*, which was made into a popular film. The architect of the plot, an air-force officer named Jean-Marie Bastien-Thiry, was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad. De Gaulle survived all the assassination attempts and died of a heart attack at the age of 80.

What strategies, tactics and technology were used?

The French

France started off with 56,000 troops in Algeria at the beginning of the war. By 1956–57, this number had grown substantially, with 80,000 alone patrolling the border with Tunisia and a further 300,000 trying to protect railways, farms and urban centres from attacks by FLN guerrilla groups. By 1960, the number had grown to half a million troops. The closeness of Algeria to France meant that it was relatively easy for France to send reinforcements and supplies, in contrast to the situation it had faced in Indochina.

The French had enormous advantages in terms of numbers and superior technology, and their army adopted several strategies to defeat the guerrillas:

- The French ‘regrouped’ Algerian villages in an attempt to destroy the network of civilian support for the FLN. An estimated 2 million peasant farmers and their families (25% of the population) were forced to leave their homes and move to what were, in effect, refugee camps. They were removed from their land and were not provided with any means of support. According to historian Ivan Hrbek, the ‘regrouped villages became concentration camps and their inhabitants became vagrants’. To escape this situation, a quarter of a million Algerians fled across the borders to Tunisia and Morocco, where many of them were recruited into the FLN.
- Together with this, the French army used a strategy that they called quadrillage, which involved dividing the countryside into grids, which army units would then systematically patrol to seek out guerrilla bands. This required a large number of French troops.
- They also erected a wire barrier on the Tunisian and Moroccan borders to try to stop the supply of arms and guerrillas from neighbouring countries. In 1957, they built a continuous electrically charged wire barricade – the Morice Line – along the border between Algeria and Tunisia, in an attempt to isolate FLN guerrillas from the outside world. It included minefields, belts

of barbed wire, electrified fences, floodlights, watchtowers and tripwires. In isolated areas, the line was supported by batteries of cannons that would fire automatically when set off by radar. A similar line was built along the border with Morocco.

- French air power gave France what seemed like an overwhelming advantage. They used 700 planes and 200 helicopters for aerial reconnaissance and for transporting paratroops and reinforcements to where they were most needed. They also used their air power to demonstrate French military prowess and superior technology, hoping that this would give them a psychological advantage by creating fear and awe in the minds of peasant villagers.

Algerian labourers building the Morice Line



- The French navy patrolled the coast, imposing a blockade to prevent arms and ammunition from reaching the coast of Morocco and Tunisia, from where they would be transported overland to camps near the Algerian border. The navy successfully intercepted many boats carrying weapons to Tunisia and Morocco, several of them from Yugoslavia. The blockade made it increasingly difficult for the FLN to restock its ammunition and medical supplies.
- The French also employed psychological strategies, using a combination of disinformation, indoctrination and propaganda to try to turn people against the FLN. By these means, they hoped to isolate the FLN from the majority of the civilian population.
- They also employed counter-intelligence strategies by reversing the loyalties of captured FLN operatives, so that after being interrogated they worked for French intelligence. During the Battle of Algiers the French sent former FLN activists into the Casbah, disguised as municipal workers, to spread false rumours, plant forged documents and provoke distrust. According to historians Alexander and Keiger, these detainees were 'persuaded' to change sides by torture or by threats against their families. As a result of this tactic, suspicion and confusion caused many activists to turn on each other.
- On the civilian front, the French authorities placed suspected Algerian nationalists under house arrest. Thousands more were detained without trial in detention camps.

The Algerians

The ALN forces of the FLN numbered between 20,000 and 30,000 in the early stages of the war. As they could not match the French in numbers or military technology, they used guerrilla tactics, together with efforts to gain outside support for their cause:

- They operated in small groups, attacking French convoys, bridges, factories, railways and other facilities. They targeted installations that were symbolic of the colonial regime – such as electricity generating stations, post offices and petrol depots.
- They planted explosives and booby traps in cities and towns, and the surrounding areas. Their strategy was widespread guerrilla action, using raids, ambushes and sabotage to make Algeria ungovernable.
- The FLN used the classic insurgent strategy of taking control of rural areas, especially in the more remote and less defensible regions. They had the advantage of knowing the terrain and blending in with the local population.
- The support of the civilian population was crucial to the FLN. Sympathetic local inhabitants would hide them, play along when they disguised themselves as villagers and farm labourers, and misinform the French troops and authorities.
- Life was difficult for the FLN guerrillas when the French sealed off the border, cutting off access to weapons, ammunition, supplies and reinforcements from camps in Tunisia. They were always short of weapons and, critically, of medical supplies. They developed special strategies to try to penetrate the Morice Line: they used explosive devices to breach the fence, and then tried to hold the surrounding area for long enough to allow a large number of guerrillas, weapons and ammunition through before the French could reseal the border.

- Another FLN strategy was a diplomatic offensive aimed at gaining international support, both material and moral. This was one of the decisions taken at the secret meeting of FLN leaders held at Soummam in August 1956. The Arab, Asian and communist countries supported the FLN at the UN, and the more progressive Arab governments assisted with arms and financial aid. The FLN had the moral support of most Muslim countries and independent Africa, as well as active support from Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Algerian leaders in exile played an important role in raising support for the FLN abroad, with Ferhat Abbas becoming a skilled propagandist for the Algerian nationalist movement.
- Yugoslavia was an important model for the FLN – it had also experienced guerrilla war, and was supporting socialist policies without coming under the dominance of the Soviet Union.

Historians believe that it was in the international arena that France lost the war. Two events in particular had a significant impact in turning world opinion against France. One was the hijacking of the plane carrying FLN leaders, including Ben Bella, in October 1956; the other was the French bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youcef in February 1958, which killed over 200 refugees.

SOURCE B

Some years ago the expert commentator on Algerian politics, Yahia Zoubir, persuasively suggested how the skilled use by the FLN of opportunities to draw worldwide political and media attention to their cause damaged the credibility of the rival cause of French Algeria. The propaganda work of the FLN cadres based outside Algeria succeeded between 1957 and 1961 in bringing about the condemnation of France by the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as at the United Nations and from liberal quarters in the United States. French brutality, atrocities and repression of the rights of Algerians to popular self-determination were debated and attacked in highly public places, tarnishing and weakening France's claim to epitomize 'Western civilization' and carry the banner for the 'Rights of Man'.

Alexander M. and Keiger, J.F.V. 2002. France and the Algerian War. London, UK. Frank Cass. p. 19. Referencing Zoubir, Y.H. 'The United States, the Soviet Union and the Decolonization of the Maghreb, 1945–62'. Middle Eastern Studies 31/1 (Jan 1995). pp. 58–84.

The FLN strategy of enlisting international sympathy and support proved to be highly effective.

Despite their superiority in technology and numbers, the French in effect lost the war beyond Algeria's borders. By the end of 1959 they had virtually defeated the FLN inside Algeria, but other factors proved to be more important. These included international criticism of their conduct of the war, a growing anti-war movement back home and their failure to win international approval to maintain French control of Algeria.

Question

Why did the French lose the war?



Theory of knowledge

History and learning

The Algerian War was viewed afterwards as a prototype of a modern war of liberation. It served as a model and inspiration to nationalist movements in other parts of Africa. More recently, historians and politicians have drawn parallels between it and subsequent guerrilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Does a study of the past help us to understand the present? Should politicians be able to learn lessons from history? Should history be a compulsory subject for anyone choosing politics as a career?

How were civilians involved in the war?

The Algerian War was not fought on remote battlefields, but in the cities, villages and countryside of Algeria, and so the civilian population played a significant role. Right from the start of the conflict, ordinary citizens' lives were affected either by FLN attacks or the reprisals that followed them.

Unlike the French, with their superior technology and the availability of reinforcements from France, the FLN relied on the support of the civilian population. Often at the risk of provoking harsh reprisals, Algerian civilians helped guerrillas to operate and survive by passing on information, hiding weapons and giving other means of support. The value of this support is explained by the Argentinian writer Adolfo Gilly in his introduction to the English translation of Frantz Fanon's book on the Algerian War, *A Dying Colonialism*, originally published in France in 1959 as *L'An Cinq de la Révolution Algérienne* (see also page 27).

SOURCE C

The guerrillas in the mountains, the army of liberation, did not defeat the French army militarily: it was the whole population supported by the guerrilla army which defeated and destroyed the imperialist enemy as a social force. For each Algerian soldier who died, says Fanon, ten civilians died. This indicates the mass character of the struggle. But it also indicates the complete impotence of an army, of modern weapons, and of all the tactics of powerful nations when it comes to defeating an embattled people with infinite initiative and inexhaustible heroism, a people capable of constant surprises and enormous tenacity.

Gilly, A. *Introduction to A Dying Colonialism*. Fanon, Frantz. 1965. New York, USA. Grove Press. pp. 5–6.

Discussion point

Analyse the language used in Source C and discuss how the choice of words contributes to bias. How does the fact that the language is biased affect the reliability and usefulness of the source?

Before the war, Algerian women – traditionally working inside the home – had always remained more cut off from French culture and influence than men. So, when the war started, it was the women who provided the nucleus of anti-colonial militancy, according to Alistair Horne. Some Algerian women played a more active role in the struggle, secretly carrying weapons as well as acting as spies in the French administration. The bombs aimed at civilian targets that started the Battle of Algiers were placed by three young women working for the FLN leader Saadi Yacef. A number of the doctors who treated wounded FLN operatives in makeshift hospitals were Muslim women. As the war dragged on, more young women volunteered to act as nurses in these 'hospitals', where mortality rates were extremely high due to a lack of drugs and medical equipment. Others became more actively involved in guerrilla activities. Many of these women had to overcome the opposition of their conservative communities to become involved. For some of them, the war was a liberating experience, where they could work on equal terms with men. According to Fanon, women used the *haik*, or veil, as a weapon of war, either wearing it as a symbol of resistance towards the French, or discarding it when they wanted to mingle with pied noir crowds on missions for the FLN.



An Algerian woman votes in the 1958 election for the first National Assembly of the new French Fifth Republic

Fact

The Algerian Jewish community had moved to Algeria many centuries before French colonisation. Throughout the colonial era, there were very few instances of anti-Semitism towards them from Muslims. When the war started in 1954, there were strong pressures on the Jewish community from both the Algerians and the French. This posed difficult dilemmas for many of them. Alistair Horne relates the story of one family, which symbolises the problems facing many Algerian Jews: the father of the Lévy family of Algiers was assassinated by the OAS as a suspected FLN supporter; his son was killed by the FLN on suspicion of belonging to the OAS.

The French army's efforts to clear the countryside of FLN operatives involved the forced removal of 2 million peasant farmers, inadvertently drawing many Algerian civilians into the war. To escape the dire situation in the refugee camps that were set up, a quarter of a million Algerians fled across the borders to Tunisia and Morocco, where many of them were recruited into FLN guerrilla groups. Algerian emigration to France doubled during this period, too, and by the end of the war half a million Algerians were working in France. Most of the emigrants were men between the ages of 20 and 40. Their main reasons for leaving were the relocation of the rural population and the high rates of unemployment in Algeria as a whole.

Historians point out that there was considerable diversity within the pied noir community. They were certainly not all fanatical racists who wanted to maintain European supremacy at the expense of the Muslim population. Some of them sympathised with or actively supported the FLN. Their actions ranged from giving medical assistance, providing information, transporting arms or messages, and giving financial aid, to more active forms of involvement. Many of these pieds noirs were arrested and tortured. Fanon and Horne mention in particular the support for the FLN from Algerian Jews, who made up one-fifth of the non-Muslim population of Algeria.

The writings of Frantz Fanon (1925–61)

Fanon was a philosopher, writer and revolutionary who became well known for his work on the psychological impact of colonialism and the Algerian War. His writings about the Algerian War created worldwide awareness of France's

wartime conduct. They also focused the attention of French intellectuals such as **Jean-Paul Sartre**. Of African heritage, Fanon was born in Martinique, a French colony in the Caribbean. During the Second World War, he served with de Gaulle's Free French forces in Algeria, where he became disillusioned by his experience of white racism. After the war, he studied medicine in France and qualified as a doctor, specialising in psychiatry. In 1953, he went to work at a psychiatric hospital in Algeria. After the start of the Algerian War, he treated French soldiers who were suffering from the effects of inflicting torture. At the same time, he was secretly treating the Algerian victims of this torture. He was later expelled from Algeria after taking part in a strike by doctors sympathetic to the FLN.

In 1957, he moved to Tunisia to work full time for the FLN. While there he published his study of the sociological effects of war on the Algerian population, *L'An V de la Révolution Algérienne* (1959), later published in English as *A Dying Colonialism*. He became a diplomat for the FLN and a representative of the Algerian Provisional Government in Accra, Ghana. He then completed the best known of his works, *Les Damnés de la Terre* (1961), published in English as *The Wretched of the Earth*. In it, he examined the impact of colonialism on Africa as a whole, the liberation of the Third World, and the economic and psychological effects of imperialism on colonised people. He believed that it was only through violence that colonised people could free themselves from the psychological as well as the material oppression of colonialism. He died of leukaemia at the age of 36.

Fanon came to be regarded as the champion of oppressed people throughout the Third World, and became an influential voice, especially among liberation movements in Africa.

What was the role of resistance and revolution?

The FLN was established as a nationalist movement to force the French to leave Algeria, so the concept of resistance was fundamental to the group. Resistance played a key role in unifying Algerians and drawing the civilian population into the struggle. One way in which this was achieved was through the establishment of a radio station called *The Voice of Fighting Algeria*, which broadcast news about the resistance struggle. Organised by Algerians in exile, it operated out of Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Syria, and led to an unprecedented demand for radios in Algeria. Alongside this, 'revolutionary' schools run by the FLN offered evening classes to combat illiteracy, and at the same time spread ideas of resistance and revolution.

The FLN saw itself as a revolutionary movement, which would not simply force the French to leave, but would also revolutionise Algeria. During the war, FLN leaders emphasised that independence could not be seen as a goal in itself; they were fighting for economic and social revolution as well as political revolution. At its Soummam meeting in August 1956, FLN leaders made plans for a future independent Algerian state, which included far-reaching social developments such as land redistribution and agrarian reform. These ideas made a powerful impression on rural Algerians: Horne suggests that 'profound revolution had taken place in the traditionally conservative consciousness of agrarian Algeria'.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80)

A French philosopher, novelist, playwright and political activist, Sartre was one of the most outspoken critics of his government's conduct of the war, and a supporter of Algerian independence. He was deeply influenced by the views of Frantz Fanon, and he wrote the introduction to Fanon's most famous work, *The Wretched of the Earth*, as well as the introduction to Henri Alleg's exposé of the use of torture during the Battle of Algiers (see page 28).





Theory of knowledge

History and bias

Does the title of a history book influence your expectations of what the book will be about? How do titles reflect bias? Two well-known books about the Algerian War are called *A Savage War of Peace* (by Alistair Horne) and *The War Without a Name* (by John Talbot). What did the writers mean by choosing these titles? Should history books have neutral titles?

Henri Alleg (b. 1921) Alleg was a French journalist whose family settled in Algeria during the Second World War. He was the communist editor of the newspaper *Alger Républicain*. During the Battle of Algiers, he was arrested and interrogated by the French army for a month, during which he was subjected to various forms of torture. In 1958, he exposed the whole issue of torture in a book, *La Question*, which sold 60,000 copies in France before it was seized by the authorities and banned.



Although French propagandists liked to proclaim that an independent Algeria would be a communist state, the FLN was a nationalist movement rather than a Marxist one. FLN leaders did indeed visit Beijing and Moscow, and receive arms and backing from the Chinese and Soviet governments, but historians believe that the FLN used this as a means of putting pressure on France and Western governments rather than showing a commitment to Marxism.

What was the reaction to the war in France?

French civilians were also affected by the war, though not to the same extent as the Algerian population. There were 42,000 terrorist attacks in France, perpetrated either by the FLN or the OAS, and 2800 civilians were killed. Yet while the war was being fought, the French government called it a ‘peacekeeping mission’ and many French people referred to the conflict euphemistically as ‘the troubles in Algeria’. It was only in 1999, 37 years after the fighting had ended, that the French government officially admitted that a state of war had existed between 1954 and 1962. During the war, many French people were seemingly indifferent to what was going on.

This was all the more surprising because, in fact, a large proportion of French society was directly affected by the war – all males born between the years 1932 and 1945 were called up for military service. This meant that between 1955 and 1962, 2 million French soldiers served in Algeria. These men came from all areas and all social classes of French society. Initially, however, there was no significant opposition to conscription (as there was a decade later in the United States during the Vietnam War). In France, only 700 soldiers were officially classified as deserters or absent without leave, this figure representing only one soldier in every 10,000. Nor was there any significant veterans’ movement, as returning soldiers ‘sought refuge in silence’, according to historian David Schalk.

Some historians attribute the apparent indifference of the French people to the fact that the Algerian War followed so soon after France’s own painful experiences during the Second World War.

SOURCE D

France engaged in a cruel war against the Algerians, but society refused to live in a state of war. The majority of the French people took refuge behind the moral certainty that their country, fresh from fighting for its own liberation in 1944, would not be in the position of oppressing and torturing. To look lucidly at the course of the Algerian War was to run the risk of revisiting the dark Vichy period. That would be reason enough not to speak of either period.

Stora, B. 2001. *Algeria 1830–2000: A Short History*. Ithaca, New York, USA. Cornell University Press. p. 89.

There were major restrictions on the freedom of the press in France during the war, and many publications were seized on the grounds that they were a threat to state security. Books considered inflammatory – such as those by Fanon – were banned. Despite the censorship and secrecy, however, the French public slowly became aware of the true nature of the war and the actions of their

armed forces. After the brutal Battle of Algiers, a handful of writers began to raise public consciousness about the abuse of human rights, specifically the use of torture and the misuse of power by the state. Journalists such as **Henri Alleg** (see page 28) exposed the horrors of what was happening in Algeria. Criticism also came from Catholic intellectuals who were appalled at the actions of their government on moral grounds, and from left-wing intellectuals who saw the people of Algeria as victims of an unjust capitalist state. Several of these intellectuals became the targets of OAS attacks in the closing stages of the war.

By 1960, anti-war feelings had grown considerably among the French population. More conscripts returning home after completing their national service were speaking out critically and writing articles about their experiences in Algeria. There was more open opposition to military service, and the war itself, among reservists and anti-conscription protesters.

A significant development, which showed the growing opposition to the war among French intellectuals, was the publication in September 1960 of the 'Manifesto of the 121'. The signatories included such well-known figures as the writers Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Françoise Sagan, and the actress Simone Signoret. Some leading writers, however, such as **Albert Camus**, did not sign it. This manifesto had a major impact on public opinion, and hundreds of thousands of people took part in demonstrations throughout France in support of the '121'. The manifesto clearly set out the fundamental principles of those who had signed it.

Albert Camus (1913–60)

French-Algerian writer, philosopher and journalist Camus was criticised by French intellectuals and Algerian nationalists for his failure to speak out to condemn French atrocities in Algeria. Although he was critical of French policy in Algeria, he identified with the *pieds noirs*' position. When asked to explain his silence, he said 'I believe in justice, but I will defend my mother above justice'.



SOURCE E

An extract from 'The Manifesto of the 121', September 1960.

We respect and deem justified the refusal to take up arms against the Algerian people.
 We respect and deem justified the conduct of Frenchmen who esteem it their duty to supply aid and protection to Algerians who are oppressed in the name of the French people.
 The cause of the Algerian people, who are contributing in a decisive manner to destroying the colonial system, is the cause of all free men.

Quoted in Schalk, D. L. 2005. *War and the Ivory Tower*. Lincoln, USA. University of Nebraska Press. p. 107.

Discussion point

Another French-Algerian writer, Jules Roy, responded to Camus' statement by saying: 'It is not a matter of choosing one's mother above justice. It is a matter of loving justice as much as one's mother.' What did Camus and Roy mean by their statements, and how do they relate to the Algerian War?

Activity

Discuss the differing reactions that the following might have had towards the 'Manifesto of the 121':

- Charles de Gaulle
- student groups in France
- the *pied noir* community
- the Algerian government in exile.

Another feature of anti-war sentiment on the home front in France was the Jeanson Network, an aid network supporting the FLN. It was created by Francis Jeanson, a philosopher and editor of the journal *Les Temps modernes*, with the aim of raising funds for the FLN and helping deserters and FLN operatives in hiding. By 1960, it had 4000 active members throughout France. The Jeanson Network played a crucial role in sustaining the FLN financially. By 1961, 80% of the group's funding came from Algerian workers in France, and all of this money was moved out of the country in secret. The Jeanson Network was responsible for handling much, but not all, of the money. When the leaders were arrested and put on trial, they used the opportunity to make anti-war speeches in court, which gained wide publicity.

Fact

It was only in 1997 that the French government acknowledged the deaths of the Algerian protestors in Paris. In 1998, Papon was charged in a French court with crimes against humanity, not for his role in suppressing the protests but for his actions under the Vichy administration during the Second World War. In 2001, on the 40th anniversary of the massacre, the mayor of Paris dedicated a plaque: 'In memory of the many Algerians killed during the bloody repression of the peaceful demonstration of 17 October 1961.'

It was not until 1960 that large-scale street protests against the war took place in France. The first major demonstration was organised by the National Union of Students. In October 1961, Paris police used excessive violence to stop an illegal yet peaceful protest against the war by 30,000 Algerians. On the orders of the Paris head of police, Maurice Papon, some of the protestors were beaten to death and others knocked unconscious and thrown into the River Seine. Estimates of the number killed vary between 70 and 200. In February 1962, in an anti-OAS protest at the Charonne metro station, more protestors were brutally killed by police. When the burial of these victims of the Charonne massacre took place, there was a massive protest march in Paris involving over 500,000 people.

End of unit activities

- 1 Design a spider diagram to summarise the main events in the Algerian War. Arrange it chronologically, from 1954 to 1962.
- 2 Draw up a table to summarise and evaluate the strategies used by the French during the Algerian War, using the headings suggested in the example below.

Strategy	Aim/description	Impact
Naval blockade	To prevent FLN from getting arms, ammunition, supplies	Shipments intercepted; FLN critically short of medical supplies
Forced removals		
Quadrillage		
Morice Line		
Use of air power		
Propaganda		
Counter-intelligence		
Other		

- 3 'Although it was morally reprehensible, the decision by the French to use torture was understandable and justified in the circumstances.'

Divide into two groups. One group should work out an argument to support this statement, and the other group an argument to oppose it. Hold a class discussion on the issue.

- 4 Find out what daily life was like for ordinary citizens – Algerian and French – living in Algeria during the war.
- 5 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2010/feb/28/albert-camus-algeria-anniversary-row>

Read this news article about the debates surrounding plans to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the death of Albert Camus, the French-Algerian writer who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1957. Explain why many Algerians feel that this event should not be marked in Algeria.

- 6 Research and evaluate the contribution made by one of the following to the cause of Algerian independence: Frantz Fanon; Jean-Paul Sartre; Simone de Beauvoir; Francis Jeanson; Henri Alleg.

3 Effects and results of the Algerian War

Key questions

- What were the political results of the war?
- What were the economic and social effects of the war?
- How did the war affect Algeria's position in the world?

Overview

- The Evian Accords between France and the Algerian nationalists brought the war to an official end.
- However, the OAS stepped up its campaign of terror in Algeria, and launched a scorched earth policy to destroy infrastructure.
- Over 900,000 pieds noirs left Algeria in a mass exodus.
- Many harkis, Algerians who had supported the French, left as well, and thousands of those who remained were killed.
- There were divisions among the nationalists, and a struggle for power, until Ahmed Ben Bella became the first leader of independent Algeria.
- In France, within six years of the end of the war, those involved in the OAS and the attempted coup were granted amnesties.
- The cost of the war was enormous, in human lives and in material damage: over 17,000 French soldiers, 3000 pieds noirs and an estimated 1 million Algerians died during the war.
- Algeria faced critical economic problems after the war, aggravated by the departure of the pieds noirs with their technical skills and capital.
- A policy of 'Algerian socialism' saw the expropriation of land, the establishment of state-owned farms and a system of 'self management' in business and industry.
- The dislocation of the peasant population during the war led to rapid urbanisation, resulting in high levels of unemployment and the growth of slums.
- As a newly independent state, Algeria joined the United Nations, the Arab League and the Organisation of African Unity. It followed a policy of non-alignment in foreign affairs and joined the Non-Aligned Movement. It also became an influential member of OPEC.
- In spite of the bitterly fought war of independence, Algeria maintained an uneasy economic association with France, which included the increased migration of Algerian workers to France.

Timeline

- 1962 Mar** Evian Accords; establishment of provisional governing council in Algeria
- Apr** referendum in France approves Evian accords
- May** escalation of violence by OAS
- Jun** exodus of pieds noirs begins
- Jul** referendum in Algeria approves independence; two days later, independence of Algeria formally recognised
- Aug** execution of harkis begins
- Sep** election of Algerian constituent assembly
- Dec** massacre of harkis
- 1963 Sep** Algerian constitution approved in referendum; Algeria becomes one-party state
- Oct–Nov** war with Morocco over border
- 1965 Jun** Ben Bella overthrown in coup led by Boumediène

What were the political results of the war?

The terms of the peace settlement

In the Evian Accords, it was agreed that units of the French army would remain in Algeria for five years, and that France could lease the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir for 15 years. The Algerian negotiators made several concessions regarding the rights of Europeans who remained in Algeria: they could have dual nationality for three years, and then the option of Algerian citizenship or the status of privileged foreign residents. A clause in the agreement stated that their property rights would be respected, and that their lands would not be taken from them without compensation. For six years, French companies would get preferential rights when permits were granted to exploit the oil and natural gas reserves in the Sahara. In return, France offered economic aid to Algeria by continuing to carry out de Gaulle's Constantine Plan (see page 20). A provisional governing council was set up in Algeria to oversee events from the Algerian side until the referendum could be held and the future confirmed.

Question

Why do you think that the Algerians were willing to make so many concessions in the Evian Accords?

The aftermath of the peace settlement

However, the settlement did not bring peace to Algeria. Within days of the signing of the Evian Accords, OAS leaders virtually declared war on the French government. They fortified an area of Algiers, attacked French military convoys and called on the European civilians of Algiers to join them there. But the French army had orders to prevent this from happening, and in the ensuing violence dozens of European civilians were killed and hundreds injured by machine-gun fire. After this, the *pieds noirs* began to leave Algeria in large numbers, in spite of OAS orders that they were not to leave the country.

When the results of the referendum held in France revealed that over 90% of voters supported the peace plan, the OAS stepped up its campaign in Algeria and launched a scorched earth policy, attacking and destroying clinics, schools and municipal buildings, and burning down the Algiers library, with its 60,000 books. It also stepped up random attacks on Muslim Algerians. The situation in Oran was so bad that Muslims moved for safety to villages or other cities that had smaller European populations. In this atmosphere of fear and vengeance, the FLN was finding it difficult to 'hold back an exasperated Muslim population which wanted to strike back', according to Benjamin Stora. But even the most hardline of the OAS commandos realised that they could not continue and, after attacking and robbing banks for funds, they began to leave Algeria in trawlers filled with weapons and money. Their departure speeded up the exodus of *pied noir* civilians, who abandoned their belongings and waited for boats. A grim phrase in common usage at the time was that they had a choice between 'the suitcase or the coffin'. More than 900,000 *pieds noirs* left Algeria in one of the biggest mass migrations since the Second World War. Alistair Horne questions whether the *pieds noirs* could have continued to live in Algeria, even if the OAS had not launched its campaign of violence which further divided the two communities (see Source A on page 33).

In addition, over 50,000 *harkis* – Algerians who had been loyal to France during the war – left to settle in France, where they faced enormous difficulties integrating into French society. They were often treated as outcasts by the French and as traitors by Algerian migrant workers in France. An official estimate of the number of *harkis* who had been linked in some way to the French army

or police was 263,000, but when the French army withdrew in 1962, the harkis were disarmed. Many of them – and sometimes their families as well – were ‘slaughtered by FLN groups in an orgy of revenge’, according to Martin Meredith. Historians estimate the number killed at between 30,000 and 150,000.



Pieds noirs leaving Algeria by boat in 1962



Theory of knowledge

History and language

Is our perception of historical events affected by an author's choice of words? Should historians always try to use neutral language? Or is the use of emotive language a justifiable way to make history come alive to the reader?

Question

Why did the pieds noirs leave Algeria?

SOURCE A

Taking into account the huge discrepancy in wealth, property and land between the two communities – nine-tenths belonging to one-tenth – the excruciating land hunger of the Algerians coupled to their soaring birthrate, racial stresses and pied noir intolerance, and – perhaps above all – the accumulated hatreds of seven and a half years of war, could the Europeans realistically have remained more than a few additional years at best?

Horne, A. 2006. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962*. New York, USA. *New York Review of Books*. p. 547.

Ahmed Ben Bella (b. 1918)

Ben Bella fought for France in the Second World War and joined the resistance movement in response to the harsh repression that followed the Sétif demonstration. Imprisoned in 1950, he escaped and made his way to Cairo, where he was one of the founder members of the FLN. He was later kidnapped and imprisoned in France for the duration of the Algerian War. He became the first leader of independent Algeria, but was subsequently overthrown in a coup. After 15 years either in prison or under house arrest Ben Bella went to France, where he formed an opposition party calling for a multi-party democracy in Algeria. He returned to Algeria in 1990 and ran unsuccessfully for president in the 1991 election.

Houari Boumediène (1932–78)

Joining the FLN in 1955, Boumediène became chief of staff of its armed wing, the ALN, in 1960. He served as minister of defence and vice president under Ben Bella, but became increasingly critical of Ben Bella's policies and leadership, and led an army coup to overthrow him in 1965. As leader of Algeria, he focused on state-driven industrial development, and in 1971 nationalised Algeria's oil industry, provoking outraged criticism from France. He used oil revenues to fund economic development in Algeria. He ruled until his death in 1978.



Divisions among the nationalists

Independent Algeria did not get off to a stable start. There was a struggle for recognition between the GPRA, the provisional government in exile that had been formed by the FLN in 1958, and the guerrilla leaders of the ALN, the armed wing of the FLN. There were also ideological and personal divisions between different factions within the FLN. Some of these were between the guerrilla leaders inside Algeria and guerrilla groups outside the country, in Tunisia and Morocco. There were also differences of opinion between the FLN leaders who had been in France during the war, and those who had remained in Algeria.

As the date for independence approached, there was increasing competition and confrontation in the struggle for power among nationalist leaders. A full-scale civil war was narrowly averted, but more than 1000 people were killed in clashes between rival factions. Eventually **Ahmed Ben Bella** emerged in the strongest position.

Political developments after independence

In preparation for independence, nationalist leaders had met in Tripoli in May 1962 to work out a plan to transform the FLN from a liberation movement into a political party. The Tripoli Plan called for land reform, the nationalisation of industry and services, and a commitment to non-alignment and anti-colonialism in foreign relations.

Algeria's first parliament, the National Assembly, was elected in September 1962 and chose Ahmed Ben Bella as the country's first leader. Ferhat Abbas became the president of the assembly. The new government did not include any members of the GPRA, the provisional government that had negotiated the Evian Accords with France. After the Communist and Socialist Revolutionary parties were banned, the FLN was the sole political party of any consequence, and Algeria soon emerged as a one-party state. To prevent any opposition from the largest trade union, the General Union of Algerian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens, or UGTA), this group was placed under FLN control.

During 1963, Ben Bella increased his hold on power. Under a new constitution, he became president, combining the functions of head of state and of government with that of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He could form a government without the approval of parliament, and could propose and direct all policies. There was no effective check on powers within the government. Ferhat Abbas, the veteran nationalist leader, resigned as president of the assembly in protest against the increasing assumption of power by Ben Bella.

However, Ben Bella's hold on power was not secure, and he faced challenges from other FLN leaders who resented the fact that he had not been part of the independence struggle (he had been in a French prison for much of the war). He was criticised, too, for the failure of his economic policies, and for his ruthless suppression of opposition in the Kabylia region. Although he managed to crush dissent for a while, he became increasingly isolated politically. Many Algerians did not like his dictatorial methods, and several of those who challenged his power were arrested or went into exile. Finally, in June 1965, he was overthrown in a military coup led by **Houari Boumediène**, the minister of defence and former leader of the ALN. Ben Bella was arrested and spent the next 15 years in prison or under house arrest.

Political repercussions of the Algerian War in France

For France, the loss of Algeria meant the virtual end of its empire in Africa. The war weakened the army and caused serious divisions in French society. After Algeria became independent, many people in France wanted to mend these divisions and forget the war – and the uncomfortable truths that had emerged about French wartime conduct. A number of amnesty laws were passed to pardon former OAS members: by 1968 all had received official pardons, and many OAS leaders returned to France from exile. In 1982, members of the army who had been convicted of subversion through their involvement in the 1961 attempted coup were allowed to serve in the military again. It was only in the 1990s that a more thorough examination of some of the more controversial issues relating to the war began to emerge.

A peaceful anti-war protest in Paris in 1961, calling for Algeria's independence



Fact

Benjamin Stora relates that when passers-by in Algiers saw tanks in the streets during the 1965 military coup that toppled Ahmed Ben Bella, they ignored them, thinking that they were part of the film set for Italian director Gillo Pontecorvo's famous film, *The Battle of Algiers*.

Discussion point

Is it the task of a historian to raise questions about the past, even if memories are painful and potentially divisive? Discuss how one could challenge the argument that it is better to forget the past and focus on the future.

What were the economic and social effects of the war?

The cost of the war

The cost of the war for Algeria was extremely high. Close to 1 million Algerians were killed – in fighting, in the refugee camps, as a result of torture, or as a result of forced removals. The peasants were impoverished as a direct result of the war: over 2 million of them had been forcibly moved from their homes, and a quarter of a million of them were refugees in Morocco and Tunisia. Over 10,000 houses had been destroyed during the war or immediately afterwards in the OAS attacks. There was also massive destruction of infrastructure such as schools, government buildings, bridges, medical centres and railways, as well as damage to land and crops. The scorched earth policy also devastated economic potential and hindered recovery. However, historian Ivan Hrbek suggests that despite the high cost in human life and damage, the Algerian War demonstrated some important lessons.

Question

According to the historian quoted in Source B, what was the significance of the Algerian independence struggle?

SOURCE B

No other African nation paid such a high and tragic price for its independence. But by their heroic fight, the Algerians objectively aided the political struggle in the other French colonies. The Algerian War made clear to the French public and their political leaders the futility of the old colonial system, and forced them to recognize the right of every nation to self-determination.

Hrbek, I. 'North Africa and the Horn'. From Mazrui, A (ed.). 2003. General History of Africa: Volume 8: Africa since 1935. Cape Town, South Africa. New Africa Books/UNESCO. pp. 139–40.

Over 17,000 French soldiers were killed and 10,000 European civilians were casualties of war – either killed, wounded or missing. The cost of the war to French taxpayers was high: according to one estimate, the military costs alone were between 10% and 18% of GDP. There was also a shortage of labour in France during the war, caused by the absence of half a million men fighting in Algeria. Ironically, their places were filled by Algerian workers, and Algerian immigration to France increased by 30% during the war years. After the war, the French economy boomed as the drain of the war on resources came to an end.

Economic problems at the time of independence

Algeria had a typical colonial economy, which had existed for the benefit of metropolitan France. Large modern commercial farms owned and operated by the *pieds noirs* had exported agricultural products to France, while traditional peasant farmers operated at a subsistence level with low productivity. Local craft industries had declined because of competition from French manufactured goods. As a result, there was very little industry in Algeria. De Gaulle's Constantine Plan of 1958 was a belated attempt to change this by industrialising the economy. In spite of this, by the time of independence, industry represented only about 25% of production.

The war and the events in its aftermath had a devastating effect on the economy. As well as the destruction of infrastructure, houses and farms, there were hundreds of thousands of homeless and displaced people, and about 70% of the workforce was unemployed. This massive dislocation of the economy affected Algeria for a long time after independence.

The economic difficulties facing the new state were aggravated by the sudden departure of over 900,000 *pieds noirs*, who took with them their technical skills and capital. When they abruptly left, factories closed, big commercial farming operations were abandoned and thousands of jobs were lost. Source C (page 37) explains some of the implications of this development.

The loss of human capital also included the hundreds of thousands of Algerians living in France. Since the First World War, they had moved there to find work. Many of them believed that they would return home once Algerian independence was secured. In fact, the opposite happened, and the rate of Algerian emigration to France increased (see Source D on page 37).

SOURCE C

The war of national liberation and its aftermath severely disrupted Algeria's society and economy. In addition to the physical destruction, the exodus of the *colons* deprived the country of most of its managers, civil servants, engineers, teachers, physicians, and skilled workers – all occupations from which the Muslim population had been excluded or discouraged from pursuing by colonial policy ... Distribution of goods was at a standstill. Departing *colons* destroyed or carried off public records and utility plans, leaving public services in a shambles.

Metz, H. C. (ed). 1994. *Algeria: A Country Study*. Washington, USA. GPO for the Library of Congress. <http://countrystudies.us/algeria/36.htm>

SOURCE D

Seven and a half years of war, marked by destruction and the displacement of populations, the OAS's relentless efforts to destroy the country's infrastructures, the rapid mass exodus of Europeans, the profound disorganization in Algeria that resulted, the sudden arrival on the labour market of tens of thousands of freed Algerian prisoners or demobilized soldiers, and the 'civil war' for power were all factors that explain the resumption of emigration to France in the summer of 1962.

Stora, B. 2001. *Algeria 1830–2000: A Short History*. Ithaca, New York, USA. Cornell University Press. p. 128.

Question

What evidence is there to suggest that the departing *pieds noirs* deliberately tried to sabotage Algeria's future development as an independent nation?

37

Economic policies adopted after independence

The economic policies of the new government were known collectively as 'Algerian socialism', and involved widespread state involvement in the economy. The most pressing issue was a programme of land reform. The farms abandoned by the *pieds noirs* were taken over by the state, and the rest were seized in 1963. They were placed under committees of workers. Within two years, 40% of the farmland was state owned and state run. Despite some initial difficulties, these state farms were soon producing 80% of the nation's agricultural output. However, there were problems: the local market for certain agricultural products (such as wine), to which the economy had been geared, had shrunk, while the country could not produce enough cereal crops to feed its growing population. Industrial output also declined, according to Stora, by 55% between 1962 and 1963. At the same time, public services expanded. The army was also a significant drain on the economy, costing 10% of GDP in 1963.

Workers took control of factories and businesses to keep them going after the departure of their European managers, in a government-sponsored system called 'self-management' which met with varied success. Algeria's later emergence as a major oil and natural gas producer gave a significant boost to the economy.

Fact

Algeria's economic development was negatively affected by an extremely high population growth rate during the 1970s and 1980s – one of the highest in the world. This put a severe strain on employment, housing, education and health strategies. At the time of independence in 1962, Algeria had a population of just under 10 million; by 1994, it was just under 27 million, and by 2010 nearly 35 million.

The social effects of the war

In 1962, Algeria was still a predominantly rural society, but the displacement of the rural population during the war created massive social problems. Disrupting the traditional link between people and the land, which had been a strong feature of peasant agriculture, had many negative side effects. Thousands of landless peasants moved to the cities when they left the resettlement camps, many of them settling into apartments left vacant by the departing *piets noirs*. Between 1960 and 1963, 800,000 moved to the cities – half of them to Algiers. This resulted in more slums being built close to the cities, and an explosion in sub-standard housing.

Children in a shanty town in Algeria in 1976, one of the many areas of slum housing that sprang up in the 1960s as a result of poverty and urban overpopulation



This rapid urbanisation profoundly changed the economy and social structure of Algeria. Most migrants to the cities ended up unemployed or doing unskilled work or odd jobs. In 1963, there were 2 million unemployed and this created serious social problems, such as violent crime, peasant revolts and demonstrations by unemployed people. Increasing numbers left Algeria to find work in France in order to survive.

The social policies of the new government aimed to wipe out illiteracy, develop an Arab Islamic culture, promote public medicine and support women's liberation. However, historians such as Horne suggest that the emancipation of women lagged behind the promises of the war years, when women operatives in the FLN had greater equality than they had in post-war Algeria. The new government also wanted to regulate and control the flow of emigrants to France.

How did the war affect Algeria's position in the world?

Algeria's leaders saw their country as part of both the Arab world and Africa. Algeria joined the Arab League, and became a founder member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Ben Bella spoke out in support of African liberation movements still fighting for independence, such as those in the Portuguese colonies, and denounced **neo-colonialism**. Algeria also joined the United Nations (UN), which had provided steady support to the FLN during the struggle for independence. As an important oil-producing country, Algeria joined **OPEC**. In spite of its socialist economic policies, Algeria did not become a member of the Soviet bloc and instead followed a policy of non-alignment, joining the **Non-Aligned Movement** (NAM).

However, the dream of creating greater unity between the countries of North Africa did not happen, partly due to border disputes. Algeria's borders, drawn by the French in the colonial era, created conflicts among the Maghreb states after independence. Algeria and Morocco even fought a brief war over the position of a section of this border in October–November 1963. Tunisia also wanted a revision of its border with Algeria, and there was friction between Libya and Algeria over their shared border, after oil reserves were discovered on the Algerian side.

Post-war relations with France

Surprisingly, perhaps, Algeria and France maintained good relations during the 1960s. Algeria had oil and natural gas, which France needed, and France in return provided aid and technical assistance to Algeria. After independence, French technicians worked in the Algerian oil industry, and young Frenchmen served as teachers in Algerian schools instead of doing national service. Historians Oliver and Atmore comment on the nature of the relationship between the two countries:

SOURCE E

In spite of the oppression and hatreds engendered, the relationship between France and Algeria, between Algerians and Frenchmen, had been exceptionally close, and the revolt when it came was almost like a violent quarrel between members of a family. In some respects, at least, the rift took a surprisingly short time to heal.

Oliver, R. and Atmore, A. 2004. *Africa since 1800*. Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press (5th edition). p. 242.

Fact

The government of independent Algeria put enormous effort and resources into raising levels of education. At the time of independence, fewer than 15% of Algerian children attended school: only 700,000 children were in primary schools. By 1970, this number had risen to 2 million, and ten years later to 4.5 million. To help with the shortage of teachers, 11,000 teachers from France travelled to Algeria over the years. Special efforts were made to improve access to education for girls.

neo-colonialism A term that was first used by the Ghanaian president, Kwame Nkrumah, to describe the continuing economic control that industrialised countries have over their former colonies.

OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. This group has a decisive influence over the world supply and pricing of oil. It has 12 member states – from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America – that between them control one-third of the world's oil production and hold two-thirds of the world's oil reserves.

Non-Aligned Movement An organisation formed by countries that did not want to become part of either the Western or Soviet blocs during the Cold War. They agreed that they would not join alliances or defence pacts with the superpowers, and that they would present a united front on matters of common interest. Most of the NAM's members were former colonies in Africa and Asia. Boumediène played a prominent role in it, serving as secretary general from 1973 to 1976.

Fact

With its substantial Algerian migrant population, France has the largest Muslim population in Western Europe. This has created certain tensions in France, and government policies promoting secularism have been controversial. The socio-economic circumstances in which many migrants live have led to serious anti-government protests and riots in recent years.

However, the steady wave of Algerian immigrants created problems in France. Many entered the country illegally and lived in poor conditions in slums. They were often exploited by French employers and workers. The poor treatment of Algerian workers in France created tensions between the two governments. After the deaths and injuries to Algerian workers in anti-Algerian riots, the Algerian government stopped all emigration for a while. But it resumed again, despite French attempts to limit it. According to Stora, Ben Bella's government did not favour emigration to France, but saw it as an important 'safety valve' to ease the pressure on the labour market, and to improve the balance of payments through the money sent back to Algeria by emigrant workers to support their families. By 1965 there were an estimated 450,000 Algerian workers in France, and by 2004 this number had grown to over 2 million.

End of unit activities

- 1 Draw up a table to summarise the political, economic and social effects of the Algerian War, using the suggested headings in the example below.

	Before the war	During the war	After the war
Political situation			
Economic situation			
Social situation			


- 2 Investigate the situation of either the *Pieds noirs* or the *harkis* after their post-independence move to France. Did they adjust to life in France? Were they assimilated into French society? How were the *Pieds noirs* and the *harkis* perceived and treated?
- 3 'In view of their policies during the colonial period and their actions during the Algerian War, the French had a moral obligation to provide more aid to Algeria after independence.'

Divide into two groups. One group should work out an argument to support this statement, and the other group an argument to oppose it. Hold a class debate on the issue.

- 4 Imagine that you are a journalist who interviewed Ferhat Abbas before his death in 1985. Work out what questions you would ask him about the change in his outlook – from supporting assimilation to becoming a nationalist, his role during the Algerian War, and the circumstances that prompted him to resign from politics under Ben Bella's government. Draft the answers that you think he may have given.
- 5 Write a report to evaluate the role of Ahmed Ben Bella in Algerian history. You may begin your research by looking at this website:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/20/newsid_2943000/2943388.stm

Summary activity

Copy the spider diagrams below and, using the information in this case study, make brief point-form notes under each heading.



Paper 1 exam practice

Paper 1 skills and questions

Paper 1 contains four types of question. These are:

- 1 Comprehension/understanding of a source** – some will have 2 marks, others 3 marks. For such questions, write only a short answer (scoring 2 or 3 points); save your longer answers for the questions carrying the higher marks.
- 2 Cross-referencing/comparing or contrasting two sources** – try to write an integrated comparison, e.g. comment on how the two sources deal with one aspect; then compare/contrast the sources on another aspect. This will usually score more highly than answers that deal with the sources separately. Try to avoid simply describing each source in turn – there needs to be explicit comparison/contrast.
- 3 Assessing the value and limitations of two sources** – here it is best to deal with each source separately, as you are not being asked to decide which source is more important/useful. But remember to deal with **all** the aspects required: **origins, purpose, value and limitations**.
- 4 Judgement questions/synthesis of source evaluation and own knowledge** – this fourth type of Paper 1 question requires you to produce a mini-essay to address the question/statement given in the question. You should try to develop and present an argument and/or come to a balanced judgement by analysing and using these **five** sources **and** your own knowledge.

In order to analyse and evaluate sources as historical evidence, you will need to ask the following **‘W’ questions** of historical sources:

- **Who** produced it? Were they in a position to know?
- **What** type of source is it? What is its nature – is it a primary or secondary source?
- **Where** and **when** was it produced? What was happening at the time?
- **Why** was it produced? Was its purpose to inform or to persuade? Is it an accurate attempt to record facts, or is it an example of propaganda?
- **Who** was the intended audience – decision-makers or the general public?

Question 1

According to Source A (right), what were the reasons for the tensions that developed in Algerian cities before the outbreak of the Algerian War? [2 marks]

Skill

Comprehension of a source

Examiner's tips

Comprehension questions are the most straightforward questions you will face in Paper 1. They simply require you to understand a source and extract one or two relevant points that relate to the particular question.

As only 2 marks are available for this question, make sure you don't waste valuable exam time that should be spent on the higher-scoring questions by writing a long answer here. All that's needed is just a couple of short sentences, giving the necessary information to show you have understood the source. Try to give one piece of information for each of the marks available for the question.

Common mistakes

When asked to show your comprehension/understanding of a particular source, make sure you don't just paraphrase the source (or copy out a few sentences from it). Just give a couple of sentences that show that you understand the source.

Simplified markscheme

For each point/item of relevant/correct understanding/information identified, award **1 mark** – up to a **maximum of 2 marks**.

Student answer

There was competition between Algerian and European workers over jobs, and the Europeans had better salaries, which the Algerians resented.

Activity

Look again at the source, and the student answer above. Now try to identify **one** other piece of information from the source, and so obtain the other mark available for this question.

SOURCE A

The expropriated Muslim Algerians poured into the cities and slums, and competed with European wage earners, who had higher salaries and rights that the Muslims did not have. Competition with European workers and the vast numbers of Algerians whose land had been appropriated aggravated the conflict between the two communities. The more bitter the competition, the greater became that antagonism.

Stora, B. 2001. *Algeria 1830–2000: A Short History*. Ithaca, New York, USA. Cornell University Press. p. 24.

Examiner's comment

The candidate has selected **one** relevant and explicit piece of information from the source to explain the tension in the cities – the competition for jobs – and this is certainly enough to gain 1 mark. However, the answer overlooks a second key point.

Question 2

Compare and contrast the analyses of the nature and effects of OAS violence on the situation in Algeria in Sources A and B on this page and page 45.

[6 marks]

Skill

Cross-referencing

Examiner's tips

Cross-referencing questions require you to compare **and** contrast the information/content/nature of two sources relating to a particular issue. Before you write your answer, draw a rough chart or diagram to show the similarities **and** the differences between the two sources. That way, you should ensure that you address **both** aspects/elements of the question.

Common mistakes

When asked to compare and contrast two sources, make sure that you don't just comment on **one** of them. A few candidates make this mistake every year – and lose 4 of the 6 marks available.

Simplified markscheme

Band		Marks
1	Both sources linked , with detailed references to the two sources, identifying both similarities and differences.	6
2	Both sources linked , with detailed references to the two sources, identifying either similarities or differences.	4–5
3	Comments on both sources, but treating each one separately.	3
4	Discusses/comments on just one source.	0–2

SOURCE A

But the agreement did not bring peace. In a final paroxysm of violence, the OAS took revenge on the Muslim population, bombing and murdering at random, destroying schools, libraries and hospital facilities, attacking florists' stalls and grocery shops, determined to leave behind nothing more than 'scorched earth'. Whatever slim chance of reconciliation between pieds noirs and Algerians there had been was snuffed out.

Meredith, M. 2005. *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*. Johannesburg, South Africa. Jonathan Ball Publishers. p. 74.

SOURCE B

The last months of colonial rule as well as the first weeks after independence were marked by the rampant sabotage of OAS fascists who in their powerless fury killed, destroyed and burned. By their acts they also killed all chances for the European minority to remain in independent Algeria as provided in the Evian protocol. There followed a mass exodus of colonists: by the end of July about half a million left for France and by the end of the year fewer than 20 per cent of the Europeans remained in Algeria. On the one hand, the mass and abrupt departure of the colonists – including almost all the technicians in the country – caused the young republic many difficulties; on the other hand, it largely simplified the ethnic and social structure of Algeria and spared it otherwise inevitable racial conflicts.

Hrbek, I. Quoted in Mazrui, A. 2003. *General History of Africa: Volume 8: Africa since 1935*. Cape Town, South Africa. New Africa Books/UNESCO. p. 139.

Student answer

Source A explains that the OAS launched a scorched earth campaign aimed at terrorising the Muslim community, by attacking schools, hospitals and shops. This created so much anger towards the *pieds noirs* as a community that it would have been impossible for them to remain in Algeria after independence.

Source B describes the sabotage campaign by the OAS, which made it impossible for the colonists to remain in Algeria. So they left in a mass exodus, taking most of the technical skills out of the country, but their departure also helped the new government as there were so few Europeans left that conflict between them and the Muslim community was less likely.

Examiner's comment

The answer simply paraphrases both sources without making any attempt to compare or contrast them. There is no attempt to link the sources, or to comment on them. The candidate has therefore done enough to get into Band 3, and be awarded 3 marks.

Activity

Look again at the two sources, the simplified markscheme, and the student answer above. Now try to rewrite the answer, linking the two sources by pointing out similarities and differences between them, and referring to the sources without simply paraphrasing them.

Question 3

With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Sources A and B (see page 47) for historians investigating the origins of the Algerian nationalist movement.

[6 marks]

Skill

Utility/reliability of sources

Examiner's tips

Utility/reliability questions require you to assess **two** sources over a range of possible issues/aspects – and to comment on their value to historians studying a particular event or period of history. The main areas you need to consider in relation to the sources and the information/view they provide are:

- origin and purpose
- value and limitations.

Before you write your answer, draw a rough chart or spider diagram to show, where relevant, these various aspects. Make sure you do this for **both** sources.

Common mistakes

When asked to assess **two** sources for their value, make sure you don't just comment on **one** of the sources! Every year a few students make mistakes like this, and lose as many as 4 of the 6 marks available.

Simplified markscheme

Band		Marks
1	Both sources assessed, with explicit consideration of BOTH origins and purpose AND value and limitations.	5–6
2	Both sources assessed, but without consideration of BOTH origins and purpose AND value and limitations. OR explicit consideration of BOTH origins and purpose AND value and limitations, BUT only for one source.	3–4
3	Limited consideration/comments on origins and purpose OR value and limitations. Possibly only one/the wrong source(s) addressed.	0–2

SOURCE A

From an article by Ferhat Abbas entitled 'La France c'est moi!', published in La Défense in February 1936. Abbas wrote it to refute charges from his colonialist enemies that he was a 'nationalist', but the article was later criticised for symbolising the viewpoint of the educated francophile élite.

Had I discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and I would not blush as if I had committed a crime ... However, I will not die for the Algerian nation, because it does not exist. I have not found it. I have examined History, I questioned the living and the dead, I visited cemeteries; nobody spoke to me about it. I then turned to the Koran and I sought for one solitary verse forbidding a Muslim from integrating himself with a non-Muslim nation. I did not find that either. One cannot build on the wind.

Quoted in Horne, A. 2006. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. New York, USA. New York Review of Books. p. 40.

SOURCE B

A statement responding to Ferhat Abbas, from Ben Badis on behalf of the Ulema, published in April 1936.

For our part, we have consulted the pages of history, and we have consulted the present circumstances, and we have found the Algerian Muslim nation existing just as other nations of the world have been formed and exist ... Furthermore, this Algerian Muslim nation is not France. It cannot become France. It does not want to become France. It could not become France even if it wanted to. On the contrary, this nation is distanced in every respect from France, in its language, its moral character and its religion. It desires no assimilation, and has its own homeland, namely the Algerian homeland with its own borders as they are now established and well known.

Quoted in McDougall, J. 2006. History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria. Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University Press. p 85.

Student answer

Source A denies that Algeria was a nation, so it gives no information about the origins of the nationalist movement in Algeria. Source B is written by Abdul-Hamid Ben Badis who started the Ulema movement that saw Algeria as its fatherland. He wrote this to challenge the views of liberal moderates like Ferhat Abbas, who supported links with France. It is valuable because it shows that even though the Ulema was primarily a religious movement that wanted to reform the practice of Islam in Algeria, it also had nationalist aspirations and it rejected links with France ('This Algerian Muslim nation is not France'). This shows that the origins of the nationalist movement pre-dated the formation of the FLN. However, the source has limitations, as it is one perspective only and does not show that there were other influences on the origin of the nationalist movement.

Examiner's comment

The candidate has examined the origin and purpose of one source only (Source B), and assessed its value and limitations. The answer thus has enough to get into Band 2. However, as there are no comments about the origin, purpose, value and limitations of Source A, the answer is not good enough to get into Band 1.

Activity

Look again at the two sources, the simplified markscheme, and the student answer above. Now try to write a paragraph or two to push the answer up into Band 1, and so obtain the full 6 marks. Remember that you need to examine both sources.

Question 4

Was the use of torture by the French army counter-productive to French interests in Algeria, as some historians have argued? Use Sources A, B, C, D and E on pages 49 and 50 **and** your own knowledge to answer this question. [8 marks]

Skill

Synthesis of source evaluation and own knowledge

Examiner's tips

Before you write your answer to judgement/synthesis of source evaluation and own knowledge questions, you may find it useful to draw a rough chart to note what the sources show in relation to the question. (Note that some sources may hint at more than one factor/result). This will also help make sure you refer to all or at least most of the sources. When using your own knowledge, make sure it is relevant to the question.

Look carefully at the simplified markscheme below – this will help you focus on what you need to do to reach the top bands and so score the higher marks.

Common mistakes

When answering Paper 1 argument/judgement questions, make sure you don't just deal with sources **or** own knowledge! Every year, some candidates (even good ones) do this, and so limit themselves to – at best – only 5 out of the 8 marks available.

Simplified markscheme

Band		Marks
1	Developed and balanced analysis and comments using BOTH sources AND own knowledge. References to sources are precise; sources and detailed own knowledge are used together; where relevant, a judgement is made.	8
2	Developed analysis/comments using BOTH sources AND some detailed own knowledge; some clear references to sources. But sources and own knowledge not always combined together .	6–7
3	Some developed analysis/comments, using the sources OR some relevant own knowledge.	4–5
4	Limited/general comments using sources OR own knowledge.	0–3

SOURCE A

The terror reached its height with the 'Battle for Algiers', an attempt by the ALN to implant itself more deeply in the city. The French answered with a merciless campaign of persecution, jailing and torture, which indeed destroyed the ALN organization in the city, left a legacy of hatred and aroused a wave of indignation both in France and in the whole world where the methods of the French paratroops were compared with those of the Gestapo in Nazi Germany.

Hrbek, I. Quoted in Mazrui, A. 2003. *General History of Africa: Volume 8: Africa since 1935*. Cape Town, South Africa. New Africa Books/ UNESCO. p. 137.

SOURCE B

The death of Ben M'hidi [an FLN leader who died in prison after his arrest and interrogation] ... threw up the whole ugly but hitherto largely subterranean issue of the maltreatment of rebel suspects, of torture and summary executions; or what, in another context and depending upon the point of view, might perhaps be termed 'war crimes', and what in France came simply to be known as *la torture*. From the Battle of Algiers onwards this was to become a growing canker [a corrupting influence] for France, leaving behind a poison that would linger in the French system long after the war itself had ended. The resort to torture poses moral problems that are just as germane to the world today as they would be to the period under consideration. As Jean-Paul Sartre wrote in 1958, 'Torture is neither civilian nor military, nor is it specifically French: it is a plague infecting our whole era'. But what is immediately important here is the influence, or influences, brought to bear by it upon the subsequent course of the Algerian War.

Horne, A. 2006. *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962*. New York, USA. New York Review Books. pp. 195–96.

SOURCE C

France was historically the champion of human rights, the liberator of oppressed peoples, the civilizer of less advanced societies. The use of torture in Algeria betrayed this tradition and threatened the existence of liberal democracy itself. For how could anyone be sure that state agents, convinced such methods had paid in Algeria, would not be tempted to try them out on the mainland – not only on suspected revolutionaries but on anyone who happened to fall into the hands of the police? Perhaps such agents might set out to subvert the political order itself? ... The defenders of liberal democracy not only thought that the use of torture in Algeria might bring irreversible political decay to France; they also feared that exposure to such practices might infect the youths serving in Algeria with a kind of virus deadly to public and private morality. Returning home, they would transmit this virus to the rest of French society. Some feared the Algerian experience might leave some young men so unhinged they would embark on a life of crime and violence.

Talbot, J. 1980. *The War Without a Name: France in Algeria 1954–1962*. London, UK. Faber and Faber. pp. 102–03.

SOURCE D

The war was responsible for great brutalities: whole populations were moved so as to cut them off from the FLN guerrillas, and by 1959 an estimated two million Arabs (25% of the population) had been forced to leave their villages. Many of the whites in their territorial units became brutal in their tactics and indiscriminate in their targets, while in certain police stations and military detention centres a new breed of torturer appeared. The members of the FLN could be equally brutal towards the colons.

Arnold, G. 2005. *Africa: A Modern History*. London, UK. Atlantic Books. p. 29.

SOURCE E

Some years ago the expert commentator on Algerian politics, Yahia Zoubir, persuasively suggested how the skilled use by the FLN of opportunities to draw worldwide political and media attention to their cause damaged the credibility of the rival cause of French Algeria. The propaganda work of the FLN cadres based outside Algeria succeeded between 1957 and 1961 in bringing about the condemnation of France by the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as at the United Nations and from liberal quarters in the United States. French brutality, atrocities and repression of the rights of Algerians to popular self-determination were debated and attacked in highly public places, tarnishing and weakening France's claim to epitomize 'Western civilization' and carry the banner for the 'Rights of Man'.

Alexander M. and Keiger, J.F.V. 2002. *France and the Algerian War*. London, UK. Frank Cass. p. 19. Referencing Zoubir, Y.H. 'The United States, the Soviet Union and the Decolonization of the Maghreb, 1945–62'. *Middle Eastern Studies* 31/1 (Jan 1995). pp. 58–84.

Student answer

Those parts of the student's answer that follow have brief examiner comments in the margins, as well as a longer overall comment at the end. Those parts of the answer that make use of the sources will be **highlighted in green**. Those parts that deploy relevant own knowledge will be **highlighted in red**. In this way, you should find it easier to follow why particular bands and marks were – or were not – awarded.



The use of torture by the French army was indeed counter-productive to French interests in Algeria. It resulted in **international condemnation of France, opposition and criticism at home, and increased determination on the part of the nationalist movement**. There is evidence to support most of this in these five sources and I will also use my own knowledge.

The use of torture started during the Battle of Algiers in 1957. The battle started when the FLN launched **a series of bombing attacks** in the capital, Algiers. The French responded by using very harsh reprisals. **Source A refers to a merciless campaign which involved torture. This left a legacy of hatred which obviously would have increased the determination of Algerians to fight even harder for independence. It also led to criticism of France internationally and in France itself. People compared French actions with those of the Gestapo in Nazi Germany.** So this source very clearly supports the view that the use of torture was counter-productive. **It increased resistance, led to international condemnation and led to the growth of an anti-war movement in France.**

Examiner's comment

This is a good, well-focused start. It shows how the candidate intends to answer the question, and supplies some own knowledge to explain the historical context. Source A is referred to and the information from it used effectively. There is good focus on the question.

During the Battle of Algiers the French public first heard about the use of torture when some officials resigned in protest. Later they became more aware when journalists such as Henri Alleg wrote about his experience of torture. From then onwards there was **growing opposition to the war, especially among intellectuals in France.** Sources B and C discuss the effects that news about the use of torture had in France itself. Source B refers to it as **a corrupting influence that poisoned French society as a whole.** It also suggests that the use of torture would be considered **a war crime today, and that it is an ethical issue that is just as relevant today as it was then.** **This implies that many people then would have found the actions of their own army unacceptable, and this would increase pressure on the government to change its policies. In this way the use of torture would be counter-productive.**

Examiner's comment

There is some good own knowledge here, but the candidate could have used the opportunity to explain the reference to Jean-Paul Sartre and his role in the anti-war movement among intellectuals.

This view is strongly supported by Source C, which states that **people feared that the use of torture by the army and police might spread to France itself and threaten the political order. This would threaten French traditions of democracy and support for human rights.** Source C also explains the fear that people in France had that **being involved in torture would affect the young soldiers who were serving in Algeria. At that stage France had a system of conscription and 2 million soldiers fought in Algeria, so many may have been involved in the use of torture there.** **People feared that as a result they would return to France and become involved in crime and violence. The work of Frantz Fanon in Algeria supports this fear, as he clearly showed that people who inflicted torture also suffered psychological effects. So Source B would support the view that the use of torture was counter-productive.**

Examiner's comment

The candidate has linked the two sources (B and C) but hasn't explored the overlap fully. But the two sources are clearly referred to and used, showing good understanding, and there is some helpful own knowledge to clarify some of the issues raised. A really good answer would also point out the irony in Source C, which describes France as 'the liberator of oppressed peoples', because this is certainly not how the Algerians who were subjected to torture would have seen the French.

Examiner's comment

A good answer would mention that the tactics targeting civilians described in this source would also have been counter-productive to French interests.

Examiner's comment

There is good focus on the question here, but the candidate should draw attention to the obvious link between Source C and E. Source C talks about France as being 'historically the champion of human rights', while Source E refers to France's claim to epitomise 'Western civilization' and carry the banner for the 'Rights of Man'. The candidate needs to point out that the use of torture obviously conflicts with this notion.

Examiner's comment

This is a strong conclusion which focuses on the question and sums up the argument clearly.



Source D describes some of the *brutality of the war apart from the use of torture, such as the forced removal of 2 million people from their villages. This was so that units of the French army could sweep the country trying to clear out all the guerrilla units that they found. The source also mentions that the FLN also used brutal tactics. But the source does not mention the effects of any of this.*



Source E shows very clearly that *French brutality and atrocities were used by international bodies to condemn France. The FLN very skilfully used the news about this as a propaganda tool to muster up support from bodies such as the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement. Algerian nationalists such as Ferhas Abbas played a big role in getting support for Algeria internationally. As a result of this France lost support for its claim that Algeria was part of France, and instead there was more international support for the Algerian cause. Here it is clear to see that French 'brutality' and 'atrocities' were counter-productive to French interests.*



All five sources give evidence of the fact that the French used torture in Algeria, but only Sources A to C and E say something about the effects of this. But from the information in these sources it is clear that the use of torture by the French army in Algeria was counter-productive to French interests there. It increased international pressure on France to withdraw, it gave fuel to the anti-war movement at home, and it left a legacy of hatred towards the French in Algeria.

Overall examiner comments

There is good use of the sources, with clear references to them. There is also some good own knowledge, which is integrated with information from the sources. However, the candidate deals with each source separately and does not show obvious links. A good answer should do more than simply paraphrase each source separately. A good answer needs to develop an argument and use the information from the sources to support it. The candidate also needs to take a more critical look at some of the sources. Hence this answer fails to get into Band 1 – but this is a sound Band 2 answer and so probably scores 6 marks out of the 8 available.

Activity

Look again at the all sources, the simplified markscheme on page 48, and the student answer above. Now try to write a few paragraphs to push the answer up into Band 1, and so obtain the full 8 marks.

Paper 2 exam practice

Paper 2 skills and questions

For Paper 2, you have to answer two essay questions from two of the five different topics offered. Very often, you will be asked to comment on two states from two different IB regions of the world. Although each question has a specific markscheme, a good general idea of what examiners are looking for in order to be able to put answers into the higher bands can be gleaned from the 'generic' markscheme on page 54. In particular, you will need to acquire reasonably precise historical knowledge in order to address issues such as cause and effect, or change and continuity, and to develop the ability to explain historical developments in a clear, coherent, well-supported and relevant way. You will also need to understand and be able to refer to aspects relating to historical debates and interpretations.

Make sure you read the questions carefully, and select your questions wisely. It is a good idea to produce a rough plan of each of the essays you intend to attempt, before you start to write your answers: that way, you will soon know whether you have enough own knowledge to answer them adequately.

Remember, too, to keep your answers relevant and focused on the question. For example, don't go outside the dates mentioned in the question, or answer on individuals/states different from the ones identified in the question. Don't just describe the events or developments – sometimes, students just focus on one key word or individual, and then write down all they know about it. Instead, select your own knowledge carefully, and pin the relevant information to the key features raised by the question. Also, if the question asks for 'reasons' and 'results', or two different countries, make sure you deal with all the parts of the question. Otherwise, you will limit yourself to half marks at best.

Examiner's tips

For Paper 2 answers, examiners are looking for clear/precise analysis and a balanced argument linked to the question, with the good and precise use of relevant own knowledge. In order to obtain the highest marks, you should be able to refer to different historical debates/interpretations or relevant historians' knowledge, making sure it is relevant to the question.

Common mistakes

- When answering Paper 2 questions, try to avoid simply describing what happened. A detailed narrative, with no explicit attempts to link the knowledge to the question, will only get you half marks at most.
- If the question asks you to select examples from **two** different regions, make sure you don't choose two states from the **same** region. Every year, some candidates do this, and so limit themselves to – at best – only 12 out of the 20 marks available.

Simplified markscheme

Band		Marks
1	Clear analysis/argument, with very specific and relevant own knowledge, consistently and explicitly linked to the question. A balanced answer, with references to historical debate/historians, where appropriate.	17–20
2	Relevant analysis/argument, mainly clearly focused on the question, and with relevant supporting own knowledge. Factors identified and explained, but not all aspects of the question fully developed or addressed.	11–16
3	EITHER shows reasonable relevant own knowledge, identifying some factors, with limited focus/explanation – but mainly narrative in approach, with question only implicitly addressed OR coherent analysis/argument, but limited relevant/precise supporting own knowledge.	8–10
4	Some limited/relevant own knowledge, but not linked effectively to the question.	6–7
5	Short/general answer, but with very little accurate/relevant knowledge and limited understanding of the question.	0–5

Student answers

Those parts of the student answers that follow will have brief examiner's comments in the margins, as well as a longer overall comment at the end. Those parts of student answers that are particularly strong and well-focused will be **highlighted in red**. Errors/confusions/loss of focus will be **highlighted in blue**. In this way, you should find it easier to follow why marks were – or were not – awarded.

Paper 2 practice questions: The Algerian War

- 1 Assess the role of Algerian nationalism as a cause of the war that broke out in 1954.
- 2 Analyse the impact of the Algerian War on civilians in both Algeria and France.
- 3 Account for the victory of the Algerian nationalists in the Algerian War.
- 4 Examine the nature of the Algerian War and explain why it was not simply a war of national liberation.
- 5 Analyse the results of the Algerian War.

Question

Assess the role of Algerian nationalism as a cause of the war that broke out in 1954.

[20 marks]

Skill

Analysis/argument/assessment

Examiner's tip

Look carefully at the wording of this question, which asks you to link the role of nationalism with the causes of the Algerian War. You need to assess what impact nationalism had as a cause of the war, and not simply trace the rise of Algerian nationalism. Remember, too, that you need to acknowledge that there were other causes as well. And don't just describe what happened: what is needed is explicit analysis and explanation, with some precise supporting own knowledge.

Student answer

Algerian nationalism was a key cause of the Algerian War but it was not the only cause. Other factors, such as the determination of France to hold on to Algeria, French policy and actions in Algeria, and the attitude of the white settlers – the colons – also led to the outbreak of the war.

Examiner's comment

This is a good, clearly focused introduction.

When the French first colonised Algeria there was fierce resistance to it led by Abd al-Qadir, and perhaps the roots of Algerian nationalism lay in this. However, historians think that it was only after the First World War that the beginnings of Algerian nationalism can be traced. Many Algerians fought for France or worked in French factories to support the French war effort. Some stayed on in France and formed a movement called the North African Star. The main aim of this movement was to work for better living and working conditions for migrant workers, but it also wanted better rights for Muslims and independence for Algeria. Workers took these ideas home with them. The leader Messali Hadj played a big role in promoting Algerian nationalism, and when he returned to Algeria from France he formed a political party called the Party of the Algerian People. But the French authorities banned it.

Messali Hadj was not the only leader at this time who wanted better rights for Algerians. Ferhat Abbas was the leader of a group of moderates who wanted the same rights for Muslims in Algeria as the French settlers had, but did not mind keeping the link between Algeria and France. Ben Badis was another leader who influenced the growth of a nationalist movement. He did not lead a political movement, but his Ulema was a religious movement which wanted more recognition and rights for the Algerian language, religion and culture. All three leaders – Messali Hadj, Abbas and Ben Badis – had some support, but there was no strong Algerian nationalist movement until after the Second World War.

Examiner's comment

Here, the student has omitted the important developments in the nationalist movement during the Second World War, such as the Manifesto that was drawn up, the greater unity between Abbas and Messali Hadj, and so on. Mention should also be made of the situation in Algeria at the end of the war and the demonstrations in favour of independence.

Examiner's comment

It would be helpful here to show an understanding of the wider perspective by mentioning changes in Africa after the Second World War and a new outlook in the post-war world towards racism and self-determination.



France had always regarded Algeria as part of France and not a colony. *This was fairly easy to do as the two were quite close geographically.* Nearly a million European settlers (mostly from France) had settled in Algeria. After the Second World War, other European colonial powers, like the British and the Dutch, started to give independence to their colonies, but the French did not want to and instead went on ruling Algeria as if it were part of France. One reason for this was the strong influence that the settlers had in French politics.

Examiner's comment

This section should explain how the attitude of the *colons* towards reform motivated the Algerian nationalist movement. Also, the student should have explained that these two factors – French colonial policies after the war and the presence of the *colons* – were also causes of the war.



The settlers owned most of the best farmland in Algeria, and most of the businesses. They led a privileged lifestyle where the laws favoured them, and kept the Muslim majority in an inferior position. *When the French government had tried to introduce a few reforms to the system before the Second World War, the settlers had objected so strongly that the French government had backed down.* After the Second World War, the settlers were just as determined to maintain their powers and privileges in Algeria.



Events in Sétif in Algeria in May 1945 brought matters to a head. Protestors carrying the flag of the nationalist movement clashed with police. This was followed by brutal attacks on the Muslim population by the police and by the settlers. Thousands of people were killed. *Historians see this as the turning point which changed the situation in Algeria. It united the nationalist movement, and even moderates like Abbas began to demand independence for Algeria.*

The harsh repression after the events in Sétif *spurred on the nationalist movement.* The French government did not realise the extent of the *growing nationalist movement and tried to make last-minute reforms, which were rejected by the nationalists.* In 1954, militant nationalists formed the FLN with the objective of overthrowing French rule in Algeria. They launched a series of attacks in Algiers in November 1954, and this was the start of the Algerian War.

Examiner's comment

There is a clear focus once again on the question here. But the student mentions factors that have not been discussed in the essay. The conclusion should round off the argument and not raise new issues that have not already been covered.

The growth of the nationalist movement was therefore a direct cause of the outbreak of the war. But the rise of nationalism has to be understood against the background of French colonial policies after Second World War, the presence and attitude of the European minority in Algeria, and the discriminatory policies towards the Algerian Muslim population.

Overall examiner's comment

There is good evidence of the candidate's supporting own knowledge. In the introduction and conclusion to the essay, the candidate has made a good attempt to focus on the question. However, this focus needs to be maintained throughout the essay. Too much of the essay tends to be narrative and descriptive, rather than explanation or analysis. Hence this answer fails to get beyond Band 3.

Activity

Look again at the simplified markscheme on page 54 and the student answer above. Now try to write a few extra sentences or paragraphs to push the answer up into Band 2. Focus on trying to analyse rather than narrate what happened.

Further information

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
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